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The CARD Act on Campus 
Jim Hawkins∗ 
Abstract 
In February 2010, the Credit Card Accountability, 
Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) Act intervened in student 
credit card markets in a dramatic way, attempting to prevent 
student over-indebtedness, to end aggressive marketing to college 
students, and to reveal and change avaricious agreements between 
credit card issuers and colleges. Yet, two years after it became 
effective, we still have little measurement of whether the Act has 
accomplished these goals.  
This Article offers the first empirical assessment of the 
rationales for the CARD Act and the Act’s effects. Over the two 
years since the CARD Act went into effect, I conducted surveys of 
more than 500 students at two different colleges. I also examined 
300 agreements between issuers and college-related organizations, 
which the CARD Act made publicly available for the first time. 
Based on this survey and study, I found that many of the 
CARD Act’s student and young consumer provisions have not 
affected credit markets in the ways the Act’s proponents had 
hoped. Young consumers are still qualifying for credit cards 
without enough earned income to pay off the debt, and students 
are still reporting high levels of credit card marketing efforts 
aimed at the students. Most strikingly, the requirement that credit 
card companies disclose the secret agreements between issuers and 
colleges has caused virtually no change in the number of these 
agreements or their terms.  
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I. Introduction 
The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act)1 is the most important credit 
card legislation of our generation.2 Among the many important 
provisions of this ground breaking Act, the Act’s sponsors 
highlighted its protections of young consumers and college 
students as some of the most significant. Senator Christopher 
Dodd argued: “It is time to insist that credit card companies take 
into account a young person’s ability to repay before allowing 
them to take on what is all too often a lifetime worth of debt. Very 
little we do in our legislation will be more important than these 
provisions.”3  
Senator Dodd was referring to several provisions that affect 
how credit card companies interact with students and young 
consumers. First, the CARD Act requires that credit card 
companies verify that people under twenty-one have the ability to 
repay their credit card debt.4 Second, it places restrictions on 
credit card issuers’ marketing activities aimed at young 
consumers, including prohibiting giving tangible gifts to students 
on college campuses and banning credit bureaus from giving out 
young consumers’ addresses.5 Finally, it obligates credit card 
companies and colleges to disclose their agreements about credit 
card marketing to students.6 The central goal of these provisions 
was to prevent young consumers from accumulating excessive 
credit card debt.7 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734. 
 2. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, The CARD Act in Perspective: 
Ongoing Efforts to Find Balance in Credit Card Regulation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
335, 336 (2011) (stating that “the country has struggled to strike a balance 
between the risks of consumer indebtedness and the convenience that credit 
cards provide” and calling the CARD Act “the most important effort to recast 
this balance in several generations”). 
 3. 155 CONG. REC. S5,316 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Christopher Dodd). 
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
 5. See infra Part III.B. 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. See infra Part III.D. 
1474 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1471 (2012) 
Student credit cards are a hotly contested issue,8 and the 
CARD Act’s young consumer provisions have similarly 
generated significant academic debate about their theoretical 
underpinnings and likely effects.9 But, two years after these 
protections became effective, we still have little empirical 
measurement of whether the Act’s goals have been achieved and 
whether either critics’ or supporters’ predictions about the Act 
have come true. While academics have conducted empirical 
studies on other aspects of the Act10 and have noted the efficacy 
                                                                                                     
 8. For just a few of the many possible examples, see generally RONALD J. 
MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD 
MARKETS (2006) (providing a detailed discussion of credit cards and their costs 
and benefits); ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT (2000) (discussing the prevalence of credit card 
usage in the United States, including a chapter devoted to credit cards aimed at 
college students); Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of 
Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 85 
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (analyzing the financial difficulties of those who 
completed some college but did not graduate); Vincent D. Rougeau, 
Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest 
Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing the growing problems associated 
with credit cards, with students as one aspect of the overall problem). 
 9. See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, Young Consumer Protection in the 
“Millennial” Age, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 369 (2011) [hereinafter Young Consumer 
Protection] (discussing and predicting the effects of the Act’s young consumer 
provisions); Eboni S. Nelson, From the Schoolhouse to the Poorhouse: The Credit 
CARD Act’s Failure to Adequately Protect Young Consumers, 56 VILL. L. REV. 1 
(2011) [hereinafter Schoolhouse to Poorhouse] (applauding the passage of the 
Act and suggesting further action); Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, 
Old Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit CARD 
Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407 (2011) (advocating for the repeal of a section of the 
Act that forbids individuals under age twenty-one from having credit cards); 
Manley Williams & Sara E. Emley, CARD Act’s Ability to Pay Proposal Ignites 
Public Policy Debate, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1417 (2011) (describing the debate 
between the business community and consumer advocates over the Act’s ability-
to-pay proposal); Regina L. Hinson, Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 
14 N.C. BANKING INST. 287 (2010) (describing the Act’s background, 
modifications, and likely effects); Kathryn A. Wood, Note, Credit Card 
Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009: Protecting Young 
Consumers or Impinging on Their Financial Freedom?, 5 BROOKLYN J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 159 (2010) (describing the Act’s intended impact on young people, 
the negative effects it will have, and some proposed solutions). 
 10. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD 
Act and Beyond 1 (N.Y.U. Center for L., Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 11-40, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960005 (arguing that “[p]ost-CARD 
Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low short-term prices, 
and imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the cost of 
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of many of its provisions,11 no one has measured the impact of 
the young consumer provisions. Members of Congress have been 
quick to congratulate the government for stopping “students from 
being sent credit card offers”12 without bothering to check if the 
CARD Act’s provisions have actually had that effect.   
The Act’s consequences for college students and other young 
consumers should be the central concern of those studying these 
provisions. As Elizabeth Warren observed, while serving as 
Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of 
the Treasury on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
[The Bureau] think[s] it is appropriate to ask whether [the 
Act] has had its intended effects and how the credit card 
marketplace has changed. Where there are clear causal links, 
we need to draw them out. And where the connections are 
more tenuous, we need to keep asking questions and analyzing 
data.13 
                                                                                                     
credit card borrowing”); Joshua M. Frank, Credit Card Clarity: CARD Act 
Reform Works (Center for Responsible Lending, Working Paper, Feb. 16, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000416 (evaluating the CARD Act’s 
effects on interest rates and direct mail offers); THE PEW HEALTH GROUP, TWO 
STEPS FORWARD: AFTER THE CREDIT CARD ACT, CREDIT CARDS ARE SAFER AND 
MORE TRANSPARENT—BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN (2010), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=60075 (reporting the 
findings of a survey of credit card issuer practices, but only devoting fifty-seven 
words to the young consumer provisions). The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau held a conference on the one-year anniversary of the CARD Act’s 
provisions entering into force and emphasized the need to measure the Act’s 
effects, but none of the key findings presented at the conference related to the 
young consumer provisions. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CARD 
Act Conference: Key Findings, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-
cards/credit-card-act/card-act-conference-key-findings (last visited Sept. 24, 
2012) (describing the February 22, 2011 conference and its key findings) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Williams & Emley, supra note 9, at 1419 (“Early indications 
suggest that the CARD Act has been successful in eliminating some of the more 
controversial practices of card issuers.”); Frank, supra note 10, at 4 (arguing 
that the CARD Act has not made credit cards more expensive or less accessible). 
 12. 156 CONG. REC. H660 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ralph 
Hall). 
 13. Elizabeth Warren, Special Assistant to the President & Special Advisor 
to the Sec’y of the Treasury on the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, The CARD Act: 
One Year Later (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speech/the-
card-act-one-year-later (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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This Article offers the first empirical measurement of the 
effects of the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions. To capture 
information about the Act’s effects, I conducted a series of surveys 
over a two-year period that asked more than 500 college students 
about their experiences with credit card companies. Also, I 
examined 300 agreements between credit card companies and 
colleges over two years, evaluating the terms of those agreements 
and any changes that had occurred since the CARD Act’s 
implementation.  
The results are surprising. Contrary to the predictions of the 
Act’s sponsors, the Act’s restrictions on credit card companies’ 
activities have not substantially decreased the number of 
students reporting instances of credit card marketing. Similarly, 
provisions that require credit card issuers to evaluate young 
consumers’ ability to repay their debt have not prevented over-
indebtedness among students. I offer data that demonstrate how 
students are using other forms of debt to qualify for their credit 
card debt. The starkest outcome of my research is the finding 
that requiring credit card issuers to disclose the terms of their 
agreements with colleges has had almost no effect on the number 
of agreements between issuers and colleges or on the terms of 
those agreements.   
In addition to measuring the CARD Act’s effectiveness, 
information from the surveys and study calls into question some 
important rationales that academics and policymakers used for 
intervening in this market, while confirming other justifications 
for the Act. First, the low levels of student credit card 
indebtedness reported in the student surveys undermine the 
claim that the CARD Act was necessary to stop students from 
becoming overly indebted to credit card companies. Second, 
information from the agreements between issuers and colleges 
reveals that the claims that colleges are being incentivized to trap 
students in debt have been overstated. But, on the other hand, 
the agreements are primarily aimed at moving students into 
credit card accounts, a finding that confirms the suspicions of 
policymakers seeking disclosures. 
By revealing the flaws in some of the justifications for the 
CARD Act and the ways that the Act has failed to live up to its 
potential, this Article hopes to guide policymakers as they 
consider amending the Act. In addition to informing potential 
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amendments to the CARD Act itself, this Article’s data may prove 
useful to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as it 
considers how to regulate student credit cards.14 The Bureau’s 
architect initially proposed restricting all marketing to college 
students,15 and this Article can inform the discussion of that 
suggestion. Finally, this Article contributes to the academic 
debate about student credit cards. Before this Article, the social 
science literature on student credit cards had only documented 
the effects of credit education as a means of affecting student 
credit card behavior.16 This Article adds to that literature by 
studying the effectiveness of the CARD Act as an example of legal 
intervention into the student credit card market.  
Part II outlines my empirical approach, discussing how I 
conducted my two-year survey and my study of college–issuer 
agreements. I present information about the nature and 
limitations of my survey and study as well as some background 
information from the findings of these projects. 
Part III uses the results of these efforts to assess the 
rationales that proponents of the CARD Act offered in its support. 
In describing the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions, I use 
existing empirical and theoretical research to explain why 
proponents of the Act believed its young consumer provisions 
were important. Then, using the data from my survey of students 
and study of college–issuer agreements, I evaluate those 
justifications, finding some of them sound and others, including 
the most important justification for the Act, deeply flawed. 
In Part IV, I offer an empirical measurement of the effects of 
each of the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions. For the 
ability-to-repay provision, I describe how the loopholes 
Regulation Z created around the ability-to-pay requirement have 
engulfed the rule. The survey data reveal the extent to which 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 1002(12), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12) (2012). 
 15. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, 
at 8, 18 (predicting the Bureau would discourage “marketing targeted at college 
students or people under age 21”). 
 16. See, e.g., Troy Adams & Monique Moore, High-Risk Health and Credit 
Behavior Among 18- to 25-Year-Old College Students, 56 J. AM. C. HEALTH 101, 
101 (2007) (discussing the factors that various social science studies have 
researched and linked to credit card usage among students). 
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students are using other forms of debt, such as student loans, to 
qualify for credit card debt. For the marketing provisions, I 
explain that the number of students reporting instances of credit 
card marketing remains high even after the Act’s effective date, 
but I use the data obtained over the two years I conducted the 
surveys to illustrate how the Act appears to be having its 
intended effect of decreasing marketing efforts aimed at students. 
Finally, the study of college–issuer agreements reveals that the 
Act’s disclosure requirements have had little effect on the 
relationships between issuers and college-related organizations. 
In Part V, I conclude by suggesting lessons that the CARD 
Act offers to regulators who are crafting consumer credit 
regulation. 
II. Empirical Strategy for Measuring the Effect of the CARD Act’s 
Young Consumer Provisions 
This Part describes the novel approaches I took to 
understand how the CARD Act is affecting students and the 
relationship between credit card issuers and colleges or college-
related organizations. In addition to laying out the methodology I 
followed and the limitations of my approaches, I also describe 
some of the background findings that inform the remainder of the 
Article.  
A. College Student Survey Methodology 
To obtain information from students about their experiences 
with credit card marketing, I surveyed 527 students at two 
different universities over the course of two years.17 The bulk of 
the students were undergraduate students at the University of 
Houston. The University of Houston is a large, urban public 
school.18 In November 2010, I surveyed 338 students in three 
                                                                                                     
 17. All of the surveys were conducted under the approval of the University 
of Houston’s Institutional Review Board.  
 18. See Univ. of Hous., UH at a Glance, http://www.uh.edu/about/uh-glance 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Founded in 1927, the University of Houston is the 
leading public research university in the vibrant international city of Houston. 
Each year, we educate more than 39,800 students in more than 300 
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different history classes. In November 2011, I changed the survey 
instrument slightly to reflect a new year and surveyed 79 
students in another history class.19 In addition to these students 
at the University of Houston, in January 2012, I also surveyed 
students at Baylor University, a private, religiously affiliated 
university located in Waco, Texas.20 At Baylor, I surveyed 110 
students in an introductory geology class. 
In all of the classes, the response rate was very high with a 
large majority filling out the surveys. I calculated the exact 
response rate in two classes by comparing the number of people 
marked present in the class and the number of surveys I received 
back. In both of these classes, the response rate was close to 90%. 
I estimate a similar response rate in the other classes. While it 
may be ideal to have an exact response rate in every class, 
similar surveys of students relating to credit card use often do not 
report any response rates at all,21 so the reported rate of 
responses goes beyond the standard reflected in other studies. 
                                                                                                     
undergraduate and graduate academic programs . . . . UH is located in Houston, 
Texas, the nation’s fourth-largest city . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 19. The updated survey is presented in Appendix A. 
 20. See Baylor Univ., Get to Know Us, http://www.baylor.edu/about (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Baylor University in Waco, Texas, is a private Baptist 
university . . . [w]ith more than 15,000 students working toward degrees in 151 
areas of study . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. See, e.g., Sheri Lokken Worthy et al., Sensation-Seeking, Risk-Taking, 
and Problematic Financial Behaviors of College Students, 31 J. FAM. ECON. 
ISSUES 161, 165 (2010) (discussing the survey questions, the survey process, and 
the respondents but not the response rate); Jill M. Norvilitis & Michael G. 
MacLean, The Role of Parents in College Students’ Financial Behaviors and 
Attitudes, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 55, 57 (2010) (discussing the survey method, 
including the composition of the body of respondents, but not mentioning the 
response rate); Jill M. Norvilitis et al., Personality Factors, Money Attitudes, 
Financial Knowledge, and Credit-Card Debt in College Students, 36 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1395, 1402 (2006) [hereinafter Personality Factors] (stating that 
the refusal rate is unknown and the response rate therefore cannot be reported 
confidently); Jill M. Norvilitis et al., Factors Influencing Levels of Credit-Card 
Debt in College Students, 33 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 935, 938 (2003) 
[hereinafter Factors Influencing Debt Levels] (explaining that it is impossible to 
know how many refused to take the survey form but reporting the response rate 
of those who actually took a survey form); James A. Roberts & Eli Jones, Money 
Attitudes, Credit Card Use, and Compulsive Buying Among American College 
Students, 35 J. CONSUMER AFF. 213, 222 (2001) (discussing the study and the 
sample set but not the response rate). 
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The high level of responses should dispel any concerns about self-
selection bias.22 Other studies like this one that stated a response 
rate reported much lower rates than the rate in this Article’s 
study.23  
When compared to other surveys studying students and 
credit cards, this study generally has a higher number of 
subjects.24 Additionally, many other similar studies only survey 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, College Student Credit Card 
Usage 11 (Georgetown Univ. McDonough Sch. of Bus. Credit Research Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 65, 2002), available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/ 
CRC/pdf/WP65.pdf (criticizing two studies about student card use because they 
did not report response rates and, therefore, it was impossible to determine the 
level of self-selection bias). 
 23. See Celia Ray Hayhoe et al., Differences in Spending Habits and Credit 
Use of College Students, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 113, 118 (2000) (reporting a 16% 
response rate); Celia Ray Hayhoe et al., Discriminating the Number of Credit 
Cards Held by College Students Using Credit and Money Attitudes, 20 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 643, 648 (1999) (reporting a response rate of 17%); Angela C. Lyons, A 
Profile of Financially At-Risk College Students, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 56, 63 
(2004) (reporting a response rate of 34%); Carl A. Markovich & Sharon A. 
DeVaney, College Seniors’ Personal Finance Knowledge and Practices, 89 J. FAM. 
& CONSUMER SCI. 61, 62 (1997) (reporting a 49.8% response rate); Kay M. Palan 
et al., Compulsive Buying Behavior in College Students: The Mediating Role of 
Credit Card Misuse, 19 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 81, 86 (reporting a 47.3% 
response rate); Cliff A. Robb & Deanna L. Sharpe, Effect of Personal Financial 
Knowledge on College Students’ Credit Card Behavior, 20 J. FIN. COUNSELING & 
PLAN. 25, 29 (2009) (reporting a 24% response rate). 
 24. See Emma Davies & Stephen E.G. Lea, Student Attitudes to Student 
Debt, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 663, 667 (1995) (pulling data from a survey of 140 
students); Hayhoe et al., Differences in Spending Habits and Credit Use of 
College Students, supra note 23, at 118 (using a sample of 480 students); 
Hayhoe et al., Discriminating the Number of Credit Cards Held by Students 
Using Credit and Money Attitudes, supra note 23, at 648–49 (reporting survey 
responses from 426 students and using 359 surveys for analysis); Jeff Joireman 
et al., Concern with Immediate Consequences Magnifies the Impact of 
Compulsive Buying Tendencies on College Students’ Credit Card Debt, 44 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 155, 162 (2010) (surveying 249 students); So-hyun Joo et al., 
Credit Card Attitudes and Behaviors of College Students, 37 C. STUDENT J. 405, 
406 (2003) (using data from 242 surveys); Ali Kara et al., Credit Card 
Development Strategies for the Youth Market: The Use of Cojoint Analysis, 12 
INTERNATIONAL J. OF BANK MARKETING 30 (1994) (using a sample of 229 
surveys); Lokken Worthy et al, supra note 21, at 165 (using data from 450 
students); Phylis M. Mansfield et al., Self-Control and Credit-Card Use Among 
College Students, 92 PSYCHOL. REP. 1067, 1072 (2003) (analyzing 165 surveys); 
Markovich & DeVaney, supra note 23, at 62 (using a sample of 236 surveys); 
Norvilitis et al., Personality Factors, supra note 21, at 1400 (surveying 448 
students); Norvilitis & MacLean, supra note 21, at 57 (surveying 173 students); 
Palan et al., supra note 23, at 86 (analyzing a sample of 260 surveys); Roberts & 
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students at a single school,25 so including a public and a private 
school suggest the results of this survey have a greater potential 
to be more representative,26 although the results are 
geographically located within a single state.  
All of the information from the surveys was entered into and 
analyzed using Stata software. The students in the sample 
ranged from freshmen to students who had been in college for 
more than four years. Table 1 provides details of the sample. 




N = 417 
Baylor 
Univ. 
N = 110 
Total27 
N = 527 
Years in School    
1 49.16% 58.18% 51.04% 
2 25.18% 25.45% 25.24% 
3 13.43% 9.09% 12.52% 
4 6.47% 6.36% 6.45% 
More than 4 5.76% .91% 4.74% 
                                                                                                     
Jones, supra note 21, at 222 (using a sample of 406 college students). 
 25. See Davies & Lea, supra note 24, at 667 (University of Exeter 
students); Joo et al., supra note 24, at 406 (students from “the College of Human 
Sciences of one large university in a southwestern state”); Mansfield et al., 
supra note 24, at 1072 (students of “a public college in the northeastern United 
States”); Markovich & DeVaney, supra note 23, at 62 (Purdue University 
students); Norvilitis & MacLean, supra note 21, at 57 (students of “a medium-
sized state university in the United States”); Palan et al., supra note 23, at 86 
(students at “a major public [M]idwestern university”); Robb & Sharpe, supra 
note 23, at 29 (students at “a large Midwestern university in the United 
States”); Roberts & Jones, supra note 21, at 222 (students of “a private 
university with an enrollment of 13,000 students in Texas”). 
 26. Cf. Todd Starr Palmer et al., College Students’ Credit Card Debt and 
the Role of Parental Involvement: Implications for Public Policy, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y 
& MARKETING 105, 108 (2001) (“In collecting data, the researchers deliberately 
sought a mix of public and private schools . . . .”). 
 27. The percentages do not add up to 100% because the responses of 1.52% 
of students were either missing or impossible to interpret. 
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Race    
Non-Hispanic White 26.38% 80.00% 37.57% 
Non-Hispanic 
Black/African 
American 17.99% 2.73% 14.80% 
Latino 26.14% 10.00% 22.77% 
Asian 19.90% 2.73% 16.32% 
Other 8.15% 2.73% 7.02% 
Gender    
Male 48.92% 29.09% 44.78% 
Female 51.08% 70.00% 55.03% 
Age    
Under 21 73.38% 84.55% 75.71% 
Over 21 26.62% 15.45% 24.29% 
The distribution of men and women roughly approximates 
the ratios at the University of Houston,28 but women are 
overrepresented in the sample from Baylor University.29 
Similarly, in the sample from Baylor, Non-Hispanic White 
students are slightly overrepresented, and Asians and Non-
Hispanic African Americans/Black students are slightly 
underrepresented in the sample.30 In the University of Houston 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Univ. of Hous., Facts and Figures, http://www.uh.edu/about/uh-
glance/facts-figures/index.php#distribution (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) 
(providing figures from which one can calculate that 50.17% of students at the 
University of Houston are men and 49.83% are women) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See BAYLOR UNIV., PROFILE OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS FALL 2010 
AND FALL 2011 2 (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/docu 
ment.php/151566.pdf (reporting 42.1% of Baylor’s fall 2011 students are men 
and 57.9% are women). 
 30. See id., at 3 (stating that 7.9% of Baylor’s fall 2011 students are African 
American, 7.9% are Asian, 13.6% are Latino, 65.6% are white, and 5% are other 
(including Alaskan Native/American Indian, Pacific Islander, Multiracial, and 
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sample, Non-Hispanic African Americans/Black students are 
slightly overrepresented, and Non-Hispanic White students are 
slightly underrepresented.31 These differences in racial 
background are likely of no significance because existing research 
indicates race does not affect rates of credit card ownership.32 
Research has also found that attitudes toward credit are not 
affected by gender.33 The samples were purposefully skewed to 
include more freshmen and sophomores than the general 
university populations. Figure 1 compares the racial backgrounds 
of the sample and general student populations. 
Figure 1: Comparison of Racial Backgrounds of Sample Groups 
and Actual Populations
 
As with any study, this type of survey-based study has 
several limitations. First, the data are all based on answers from 
                                                                                                     
Not Specified/Unknown)). 
 31. See Univ. of Hous., supra note 28 (stating that 12.1% of the University 
of Houston’s 2011 students are African American, 19.3% are Asian American, 
23.5% are Hispanic, 33.1% are White/Other, and 12% are Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander, International, Multiracial, Native American, or Unknown). 
 32. See Robb & Sharpe, supra note 23, at 26 (citing evidence to support the 
assertion that “there is little difference in terms of credit card ownership based 
on college students’ ethnicity”).  
 33. See Joo et al., supra note 24, at 415 (finding that gender was not a 
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the students, and I could not and did not undertake any steps to 
verify that the responses were true. Some researchers contend 
that students may underreport levels of credit card use or debt 
because of the social desirability bias;34 others note that self-
reports are not longitudinal so they do not account for credit card 
debts that have been paid off by student loans;35 and others claim 
students may simply misremember information about their 
experiences with credit cards.36 Alternative approaches, however, 
would be very expensive, so surveys offer a plausible method for 
capturing information about students’ experiences with credit 
card marketing.37 Almost every study of student credit cards 
employs this strategy, so this limitation comports with 
established standards.38  
Second, the samples are not nationally representative, so I 
can only make claims about the universities I studied. This 
limitation is also present in virtually all studies of student 
cards,39 and nothing indicates that these particular public and 
private schools are atypical.  
                                                                                                     
 34. See Mansfield et al., supra note 24, at 1076–77 (acknowledging and 
discussing the “potential social desirability bias associated with the balances 
reported”); Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased 
Regulation of Credit Cards for College Students, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 112 
(2005) (suggesting that self-reporting could produce inaccurate results “because 
respondents may incorrectly report unflattering data” (citation omitted)). 
 35. See Robert D. Manning & Ray Kirshak, Credit Cards on Campus: 
Academic Inquiry, Objective Empiricism, or Advocacy Research?, 35 J. STUDENT 
FIN. AID 39, 45 (2005) (stating that “credit card debt statistics tend to be 
underestimated by respondents and do not include past credit card debts that 
were paid with student loans, family loans, or other bank consolidation loans”). 
 36. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-773, CONSUMER FINANCE: 
COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 16 (2001) (noting that reliance on 
memory is a limitation on the accuracy of reports that are based on student-
reported information). 
 37. See Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, Usage of Credit Cards 
Received Through College-Marketing Programs, 34 J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 3, 
2004 at 7, 20–21 (criticizing data based on self-reporting but noting that “survey 
responses are a unique source of information on such questions as how and 
when students first receive their credit cards and their general attitudes toward 
card usage”).  
 38. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text (providing numerous 
examples of studies using self-reporting). 
 39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (providing numerous 
examples of studies that drew their entire sample from a single school). 
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Finally, the sample was a purposive sample, so it is non-
random. This approach, however, was necessary to obtain a 
higher number of responses from freshmen, sophomores, and 
students under the age of twenty-one. The limitations of this 
purposive sample were mitigated by selecting classes that were 
part of the general degree requirements and by surveying at both 
public and private schools.40 
B. College–Card Issuer Agreement Study Methodology 
The study of college–issuer agreements made use of 
agreements that the CARD Act compelled issuers to disclose.41 
The Federal Reserve Board has posted all of these agreements on 
the Internet and has published reports about some aspects of 
them.42 My goal in the study of college–issuer agreements was to 
code information about a representative sample of these 
agreements and to determine what changes occurred within 
agreements after the CARD Act went into effect.  
In 2009, there were 1,044 agreements between credit card 
issuers and universities or related organizations.43 To obtain a 
representative sample of these agreements, I exceeded 
established precision levels where the confidence level is 95% and 
P = 0.5 by evaluating 300 agreements.44 To ensure that I sampled 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Palmer et al., supra note 26, at 111 (noting that a purposive 
sample, rather than a random sample, is a drawback, but that such a sample 
was necessary to ensure better response rates and less bias, and the selection of 
both public and private schools and students with different majors attempted to 
minimize the harm). 
 41. See infra Part III.C (discussing these agreements in greater detail). 
 42. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., College Credit Card 
Agreements, http://www.federalreserve.gov/collegecreditcardagreements (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (providing a tool to browse or search the full text of 
college credit card agreements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 43. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., College Credit Card 
Agreements, 2009 Full Data Spreadsheet, http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2010/downloads/college_credit_card_agreemen
ts_data.xls (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) [hereinafter FRB 2009 Full Data 
Spreadsheet] (providing information about all college credit card agreements for 
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. See Glenn D. Israel, Sampling the Evidence of Extension Program 
Impact (2009), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pd005 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) 
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a random collection of the 1,044 agreements when I selected the 
300 to review, I used a web-based True Random Number 
Generator to generate a list of numbers between 1 and 1,044 by 
using atmospheric noise to produce the results.45 Thus, the data 
discussed in this Article are representative of the entire universe 
of agreements between college-related entities and card issuers. 
Three research assistants obtained and entered information 
about the college–issuer agreements. I developed a written 
protocol that they followed after receiving training. After the 
results were entered and the study was complete, I reviewed the 
data for anomalies. 
For each agreement, we obtained thirty different data points. 
We pulled statistical data from the Federal Reserve’s compilation 
of information about the agreements, such as the annual 
payments by the issuer and the number of accounts opened. We 
then obtained information about whether the entities were part 
of public or private institutions and the precise types of 
association. The most significant coding work involved reading 
the agreements and recording information about (1) the 
obligations of the collegiate entities under the agreement, such as 
requirements to provide mailing lists, to exclusively promote the 
issuer, and to provide advertising help to the issuer; (2) the rights 
of collegiate entities, such as the right to approve advertisements 
and the right to royalties; (3) the terms of the credit cards issued 
pursuant to the agreement, including whether they had annual 
fees and how much interest is charged; and finally, (4) any 
changes in the agreement between 2009 and 2010, the period 
during which the CARD Act went into effect. All of this 
                                                                                                     
(discussing techniques to ensure random sampling) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Glenn D. Israel, Determining Sample Size (1992), 
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pd006 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (providing a table to 
help determine the proper sample size based on population size, precision level, 
and confidence level) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. The random number generator was found on the Internet. See Mads 
Haahr, Random Sequence Generator, http://www.random.org/sequences (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (providing a tool to generate random sequences of 
integers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The website 
explains the theory and mechanics of how the generator works. See Mads 
Haahr, Introduction to Randomness and Random Numbers, http://www. 
random.org/randomness (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (describing random number 
generators and explaining how the site’s own random number generator works) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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information was entered into a custom-designed Excel 
spreadsheet and imported into Stata for analysis. 
Most of the agreements came from a single issuer, a 
characteristic that also dominates the aggregated data reported 
by the Federal Reserve. Table 2 breaks the sample down by the 
credit card issuer.  
Table 2: Issuers in Sample 
Issuer Percentage Number 
FIA Card Services, N.A. 86.67% 260 
U.S. Bank National 
Association ND 
5.33% 16 
Chase Bank USA, N.A. 3.00% 9 
Pennsylvania State 
Employees Credit Union 
3.00% 3 
UMB Bank, N.A. 3.00% 3 
INTRUST Bank, N.A. 3.00% 3 
GE Money Bank 0.33% 1 
USAA Savings Bank 0.33% 1 
First National Bank of 
Omaha 
0.33% 1 
Barclays Bank Delaware 0.33% 1 
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. 0.33% 1 
Commerce Bank, N.A. 0.33% 1 
In terms of the university-related organizations with whom 
the issuer contracted, Figure 2 depicts that 37.67% of the 
agreements were between credit card issuers and undergraduate 
colleges, 32.67% were with alumni associations, 7.33% were with 
foundations, 2.00% were with professional schools, and 1.67% 
were with alumni associations and universities together. Entities 
that did not fall within one of the other categories made up 
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18.67%.46 Of the agreements with undergraduate colleges, 17.70% 
of the institutions were public and 82.30% were private.47 
Figure 2: Types of Institutions with Issuer Agreements
 
The agreements describe the interest rates for a variety of 
types of credit accounts. For the basic credit card in each 
agreement, the rates ranged from 6.15% to 19.9%, with a median 
rate of 13.15%.48 The agreements also contain information about 
royalties provided to the college-related organization for different 
aspects of the credit card accounts, such as royalties for each 
account opened, royalties for each annual fee paid, and royalties 
for accounts remaining open at the end of the year. Account-
opening royalties ranged from $0.80 to $50 for each account 
opened, with a median royalty of $1. Annual-fee royalties ranged 
from $1 to $20 for each annual fee paid, with a median royalty of 
$1. Remaining-open royalties ranged from $1 to $6.10 for each 
                                                                                                     
 46. This information is provided in the Federal Reserve’s spreadsheet 
aggregating data disclosed by issuers. See FRB 2009 Full Data Spreadsheet, 
supra note 43 (providing the information about each agreement).  
 47. We obtained this information by doing Internet searches about each of 
the undergraduate institutions. 
 48. To determine the interest rates for agreements with multiple possible 
rates for the basic card, I always picked the highest listed rate. Twenty-one 





 School, 6 
Other, 55 








THE CARD ACT ON CAMPUS 1489 
account remaining open at the end of the year, with a median 
royalty of $1. 
The vast majority of the agreements, 97.67%, required the 
college to promote exclusively the issuer’s credit card.49 The 
agreement between MBNA America Bank, N.A. (MBNA America) 
and Alabama State University (ASU) provides a good example of 
such a provision: 
ASU agrees that during the term of this Agreement it will 
endorse the Program exclusively and that neither ASU nor 
any ASU Affiliate shall, by itself or in conjunction with others, 
directly or indirectly: (i) sponsor, advertise, aid, develop, 
market, solicit proposals for programs offering, or discuss with 
any organization (other than MBNA America) the providing of, 
any Financial Service Products of any organization other than 
MBNA America; (ii) license or allow others to license the 
Trademarks in relation to or for promoting any Financial 
Service Products of any entity other than MBNA America; and 
(iii) sell, rent or otherwise make available or allow others to 
sell, rent or otherwise make available any of its mailing lists 
or information about any current or potential Members in 
relation to or for promoting any Financial Service Products of 
any entity other than MBNA America. Notwithstanding 
anything else in this Agreement to the contrary, ASU may 
accept print advertising from any financial institution 
provided that the advertisement does not contain an express 
or implied endorsement by ASU of said financial institution or 
the advertised Financial Service Product.50 
In addition to these terms, which serve as a backdrop for 
understanding the arrangement between issuers and colleges, the 
other terms of the agreements are discussed at length in Parts III 
and IV.  
One limitation of my approach is that interrater reliability 
was not assessed. But, because the data we gathered was based 
on relatively objective criteria, interrater reliability should not be 
a significant factor in the validity of the study. 
                                                                                                     
 49. Six agreements lacked any term about exclusivity, and one agreement 
explicitly stated the agreement was not exclusive.  
 50. Alabama State University Affinity Agreement, Ala. St. Univ.-MBNA 
Am. Bank, N.A., § 2, Oct. 30, 2001, available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/credit cardagreementscontent/collegeagreement_29.pdf. 
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III. Understanding the CARD Act’s Young Consumer Provisions 
and Assessing the Act’s Rationales 
This Part briefly introduces the changes the CARD Act made 
to the laws governing young consumer and student credit cards. 
For each change, I outline the most significant theoretical and 
empirical academic research that animated the changes, and I 
describe the arguments made in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate in support of the law. In Part III.C, I 
use the findings of my study of college–issuer agreements to 
assess the rationales that proponents of the disclosure provision 
offered in support of it. Some of the concerns policymakers and 
academics had about these agreements were proven to be 
accurate by my study, such as concerns that these agreements 
were aimed at students specifically and that they require college-
related organizations to provide private information to issuers 
and provide forums to market to students. Other rationales, 
however, including one of the most prominent, related to the 
extent to which these agreements engender high credit card 
utilization, appear to have been based on faulty, albeit 
understandable, predictions about what these previously secret 
agreements contained. 
The Part concludes by applying the findings of my student 
survey to dispute the central rationale for the CARD Act—
excessive student credit card indebtedness. I argue that a pivotal 
series of studies about student cards conducted by Sallie Mae 
over the last decade have been repeatedly misused by many 
academics offering student-card policy prescriptions and by 
members of Congress who promoted the young consumer 
provisions of the CARD Act. This argument is not intended to 
imply that the Act should not have been passed or should be 
repealed. Rather, it is meant as a call to policymakers and 
academics to establish an accurate view of student credit card 
usage and debt levels. 
In its provisions on young consumers, the CARD Act makes 
four changes to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)51 and one 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 101–45, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2008). 
For discussion of these changes, see infra Part III.A and Part III.B. 
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change to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).52 These 
statutory changes are clarified by administrative rules in 
Regulation Z. 
A. Ability to Pay 
The Act’s most substantial change to the TILA is its 
requirement that companies evaluate young consumers’ ability to 
repay debts incurred before extending credit to them.53 
Consumers can demonstrate an ability to repay either by getting 
a cosigner who can repay or by showing an “independent means 
of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed extension of 
credit.”54   
Although this appears to establish a strict standard, 
Regulation Z’s implementation of the provision reveals otherwise. 
First, under Regulation Z, young consumers who are applying for 
themselves must only have the ability to repay the minimum 
balance due each month on the account, not the outstanding 
balance.55 Paying one’s minimum balance does little to extricate 
most people from their debt because the minimum balance is a 
small fraction of the overall debt owed.56 Second, the Federal 
Reserve has been clear that students can use any income or 
assets to show an ability to pay the minimum balance. In 
explaining why it rejected suggestions to limit the income a 
student can rely on to show earned income, the Federal Reserve 
stated that it believed a lower standard “will provide sufficient 
protection for consumers less than twenty-one years old without 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601–29, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2008). For 
discussion of this change, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
 53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8) (2012) (establishing requirements that a 
consumer under age twenty-one must satisfy before being given an open end 
consumer credit plan). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a) (2012) (stating that the issuer must consider 
the ability of the consumer “to make the required minimum periodic payments 
under the terms of the account based on the consumer’s income or assets and 
current obligations”). 
 56. See Julia Lane, Note, Will Credit Cardholders Default over Minimum 
Payment Hikes?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 331, 346 (2006) (stating that the 
minimum monthly payment is generally 2% or 3% of the total balance on a 
credit card). 
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unnecessarily impinging on their ability to obtain credit and 
build a credit history.”57 
Regulation Z also clarified the statute’s provision on 
cosigners. Cosigners can be either primarily liable on the account 
or serve as guarantors.58 It states that authorized users are not 
covered by the statute.59 Although several commentators have 
argued that students need credit cards for purchases such as 
airplane tickets, Regulation Z provides young users an easy way 
to reap many of the benefits of having a credit card by allowing 
students to be authorized users. Finally, Regulation Z explains 
that the cosigner’s liability can terminate at age twenty-one for 
all debt incurred after the young consumer turns twenty-one.60 In 
addition to these changes in Regulation Z, TILA itself was 
amended to require that cosigners agree in writing to any 
increases in a young consumers’ credit limit.61 
The central rationale for requiring that students 
demonstrate an ability to repay their debts was a concern that 
students were amassing substantial debt that had negative 
consequences for their own lives and for society. As Part III.D 
discusses in detail, members of Congress and academics 
repeatedly cited high debt loans and high degrees of credit card 
use as perverse outcomes from lax credit standards for young 
consumers.62 Several high profile, tragic instances of students 
committing suicide because of debt fueled alarm about mounting 
                                                                                                     
 57. Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7722 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 58. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.51 (2012) (stating that cosigners can either be 
jointly liable or secondarily liable). 
 59. See id. (stating that the statute does not apply to individuals who are 
under twenty-one and who are added to the account of another). 
 60. See id. (allowing an issuer to provide that a cosigner will not be liable 
for debts incurred by the consumer incurred after the consumer reaches the age 
of twenty-one). 
 61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(p) (2012) (stating that a credit limit cannot be 
raised on the cosigned account of an individual under twenty-one, unless the 
cosigner approves the increase in writing and accepts the joint liability for the 
additional amount); 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(b)(2) (2012) (stating that, for an 
individual under twenty-one who has a cosigned credit card account, the credit 
limit cannot be raised before the individual reaches age twenty-one “unless the 
cosigner, guarantor, or joint accountholder who assumed liability at account 
opening agrees in writing to assume liability on the increase”). 
 62. See infra notes 113–39 and accompanying text. 
THE CARD ACT ON CAMPUS 1493 
debt levels.63 Academics posited that excessive debt prevented 
graduates from getting loans and sometimes jobs,64 and that it 
causes great stress and poor financial well-being.65 One school 
official stated that his school lost more students because of 
excessive indebtedness than any other reason.66 These concerns 
are particularly acute as other means for financing education 
provide the most aid to the richest students.67 Part III.D assesses 
this rationale. 
In addition to concern about student debt loads, the Act’s 
provisions relating to cosigners may be a response to parents’ 
complaints about harassment from creditors even when the 
parents did not cosign for the debt.68 Members of Congress 
expressed concern that parents ended up being unofficially liable 
for their children’s debt when credit card companies allowed 
students to be overextended.69 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What’s Your Score? 
Educating College Students About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 401, 401–02 (2005) (“Observers have expressed concern about burgeoning 
credit card debt loads which, when combined with already-high student loan 
burdens, can force students into quitting college, declaring bankruptcy, and 
even, in a few tragic cases, suicide.” (citations omitted)); Jekot, supra note 34, at 
110–11 (giving examples of students who committed suicide because of credit 
card debt). 
 64. See MANN, supra note 8, at 158 (“News reports explain, for example, 
that high credit card debt by recent graduates often inhibits their ability to 
obtain credit (for car loans or the like) and in some instances even impairs their 
employability.” (citation omitted)). 
 65. See Norvilitis et al., Personality Factors, supra note 21, at 1396 (“High 
levels of debt are related to a decreased sense of ability to manage one’s money 
and lower self-esteem, as well as a decreased sense of financial well-being and 
higher levels of overall stress.” (citations omitted)). 
 66. See Small CLAIMS, 13 COM. L. BULL., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 6, 7 (“The 
Chicago Tribune quoted Indiana University administrator John Simpson: ‘This 
is a terrible thing. We lose more students to credit card debt than academic 
failure.’”). 
 67. See Michael A. Olivas, State College Savings and Prepaid Tuition 
Plans: A Reappraisal and Review, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 475, 502–03 (2003) 
(describing state college payment plans as “a remarkable and remarkably 
aggressive redistribution of state resources to the wealthy”). 
 68. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 168 (“Second, and more disconcerting, 
were the harassment and even lawsuits against parents of students in default 
on their credit cards—even if they had not cosigned the loan agreement. 
Significantly, both of these practices persist and are major complaints of 
students and their parents.” (citations omitted)).  
 69. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5488 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of 
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B. Restrictions on Marketing to Young Consumers 
In addition to general concerns about students being unable 
to pay their credit card debts, the CARD Act also responded to 
problems that members of Congress observed about how credit 
cards were being marketed to students. The Act contains 
provisions about sending credit card offers to students and 
handing out tangible gifts on college campuses. 
1. Prescreened Mail Offers 
Through an amendment to the FCRA, the CARD Act 
attempts to discourage credit card companies from mailing young 
consumers credit card offers by forbidding credit reporting 
agencies from providing issuers credit reports for people under 
twenty-one, unless the young consumer consents.70 The Act does 
not directly forbid sending credit card offers, but instead it 
attempts to stop the practice indirectly by choking off a source of 
information for credit card companies. 
Before the CARD Act, academic research had established 
that college students frequently received credit card offers. 
Indeed, the “preferred marketing technique for potential 
customers was direct mail.”71 One study found that 69% of 
students surveyed reported receiving a credit card offer in the 
mail in the prior week;72 another claimed that students receive 
                                                                                                     
Sen. Claire McCaskill) (“They send these cards to kids because they know their 
parents, if they are in college, don’t want them to get into trouble and they will 
bail them out if they get in too deep.”). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(iv) (2012) (stating that, for transactions 
not initiated by the consumer, a consumer reporting agency cannot furnish a 
consumer report for use in extending credit or insurance if the report shows the 
consumer is under twenty-one, unless the consumer consents). 
 71. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 6. 
 72. See Norvilitis et al., Factors Influencing Debt Levels, supra note 21, at 
941 (“In the week prior to the survey, 69% . . . of students received at least one 
credit-card offer.”). Other studies found lower levels, such as one study’s finding 
that only 37% of student cardholders received their applications in the mail. See 
Jacquelyn Warwick & Phylis Mansfield, Credit Card Consumers: College 
Students’ Knowledge and Attitude, 17 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 617, 621 (2000) 
(finding that 37% of respondents with credit cards received the application 
through direct mail). 
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twenty-five to fifty card solicitations a semester.73 High credit 
card utilization was directly caused, studies reported, by 
aggressive marketing: “The majority of college students who own 
credit cards do not actively seek them out, but are aggressively 
pursued through the mail and on-campus by credit card 
issuers.”74 Another study found: 
Financially at-risk students are more likely than other 
students to acquire their credit card(s) through a mail 
application, at a retail store, and/or at a campus table. These 
findings suggest that aggressive marketing practices by credit 
card companies to target college students (i.e., mass mailings, 
retail store discounts, and credit card representatives on 
campus) have likely contributed to the recent rise in credit 
card debt on college campuses putting some students at more 
financial risk than others.75 
Credit card companies have a strong incentive to capture the 
student credit card market because students tend to continue 
using the account they opened in college,76 and academics have 
raised the concern that allowing students to have credit cards 
normalizes and routinizes paying with credit.77 
Members of Congress were outraged that young consumers 
received credit card offers in the mail. For instance, Senator 
Menendez pointed out that he knew a two-year-old child who had 
received an offer for a credit card and that his own children 
received an “incredible number of preapproved credit cards.”78 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Wood, supra note 9, at 163 (“This heavy marketing is demonstrated 
by the twenty-five to fifty credit card solicitations students receive per 
semester.” (citation omitted)). 
 74. Warwick & Mansfield, supra note 72, at 623. 
 75. Lyons, supra note 23, at 73. 
 76. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 4, 35 (stating that 
some issuers “marketed to college students because they viewed them as good 
customers who would continue using the issuers’ credit cards in a responsible 
way” and that many college students will earn higher incomes and be profitable 
credit card customers after they graduate). 
 77. See MANN, supra note 8, at 45–49 (describing the psychology of 
payment with credit cards as compared with other payment methods). 
 78. See 155 CONG. REC. S5410 (daily ed. May 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Robert Menendez) (recalling seeing his children, “when they were in college and 
studying but not working, get an incredible number of preapproved credit cards” 
and mentioning his “State director’s 2-year-old who got a preapproved credit 
card”); see also 155 CONG. REC. S5548 (daily ed. May 18, 2009) (statement of 
Sen. Byron Dorgan) (criticizing companies for offering cards to very young 
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Similarly, a Representative reported his thirteen-year-old son 
had received credit card offers.79 
2. Tangible Gifts on Campus 
In addition to changing the FCRA, Congress amended the 
TILA to forbid issuers from offering tangible gifts to students on 
or near campus or at student events in exchange for filling out a 
credit card application.80 The Federal Reserve has offered a 
variety of clarifications to this simple rule, explaining that on or 
near campus means within 1,000 feet of the campus; that a 
“tangible item includes any physical item” but not “non-physical 
inducements such as discounts, rewards points, or promotional 
credit terms;” that issuers can give tangible gifts as long as they 
also give them to those not filling out applications;81 and that the 
prohibition applies to consumers under twenty-one and those 
over twenty-one if they are students.82 
Academics have expressed concern that colleges have 
permitted and even endorsed credit card marketing.83 One study 
demonstrated that students who obtained a credit card through 
                                                                                                     
consumers). 
 79. See 155 CONG. REC. H4964 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Keith Ellison) (“Let me say that I knew that we had a problem in America when 
my 19-year-old son . . . kept getting solicitations for credit cards; but I was quite 
convinced . . . when my 13-year-old son . . . started getting credit card 
solicitations.”). 
 80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1650(f)(2) (2011) (prohibiting card issuers and creditors 
from offering to “a student at an institution of higher education any tangible 
item to induce such student to apply for or participate in an open end consumer 
credit plan,” whether on campus, near campus, or at a school-sponsored event). 
 81. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.57(c) (2012) (clarifying the terms “tangible item,” 
“inducement,” “near campus,” and “related event,” requiring that the creditor 
take steps to determine whether someone is a student, and making clear that 
mailings are included in the prohibition). 
 82. See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7756 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (stating that the definition of college student “is 
intended to be broad and would apply to students of any age attending an 
institution of higher education and applies to all students, including those 
enrolled in graduate programs or joint degree programs”). 
 83. See MANN, supra note 8, at 157 (“[I]t is plain that in many cases the 
marketing proceeds with the approval of the university administrators, who 
voluntarily permit issuers to implement card-issuance programs directly on 
university campuses.” (citation omitted)). 
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on-campus marketing had higher debt-to-income ratios and that 
students often believed that their college had screened creditors 
who were allowed to market on campus.84 Academics argued that 
young consumers are more responsive to truthful-but-incomplete 
advertising85 and that college credit card marketing tactics 
overshadowed the TILA disclosures.86 
Members of Congress have echoed the fears of academics, 
stating that gifts preyed on “vulnerable” college students87 and 
that issuers aggressively preyed on students.88 One member of 
Congress went even further than researchers and claimed that 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Norvilitis et al., Factors Influencing Debt Levels, supra note 21, at 
941 (finding that students who received credit cards from the student union had 
higher debt-to-income ratios than those who got credit cards elsewhere, and that 
most students believed the school evaluated companies soliciting students in the 
union). 
 85. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical 
Implications of Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 413, 422–23 (2001) (discussing what qualifies as deceptive advertising and 
arguing that college students “lack sophistication and therefore deserve special 
protection in relation to credit”).  
[Additionally], most of the concern about college credit cards is not 
about credit terms that rise to this level of deception or unfairness. 
Rather, the concern is about offering credit to people who might not 
understand the dangers of such credit at a time in their lives when 
they are unlikely to currently have sufficient income to keep the debt 
from escalating at high interest rates. 
Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 63, at 410. 
 86. See Lucas, supra note 85, at 414–15 (describing an increased emphasis 
on promotional disclosures instead of on TILA disclosures).  
[T]he specific practice of target marketing to U.S. college students 
using credit card solicitations . . . de-emphasize[s] the disclosures 
required under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Many such 
solicitations instead emphasize other promotional materials—like 
celebrity endorsements or offers of prizes, gifts or discounts—and 
have reduced the size of the required disclosures, or included them in 
inserts, in order to fit the promotional material in the text of the 
solicitation . . . . 
 87. See 155 CONG. REC. H5011 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Steve Cohen) (“College students are most vulnerable and shouldn’t be lured to 
credit cards at an early age and put into even more debt than student loans do 
by offering prizes and gifts.”). 
 88. See 155 CONG. REC. E1033 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
John Lewis) (“Credit card companies aggressively prey on our young college 
students who are not yet working. These companies rove college campuses and 
entice students with gifts, with the intent of collecting interest payments as the 
student ravels herself in debt.”). 
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the marketing techniques were deceptive.89 Like the ability-to-
repay requirement, however, the fundamental concern about 
marketing both through mailed offers and campus advertising 
was the high level of student debt that these practices ultimately 
created.90 
C. College–Issuer Marketing Agreements 
In addition to restrictions on who can obtain credit cards and 
how issuers can market those cards, the CARD Act also took aim 
at the relationship between credit card companies and colleges 
and organizations related to colleges. This subpart describes this 
part of the CARD Act and uses the study of college–issuer 
agreements to empirically evaluate the justifications offered for 
it.  
1. The Provision and Its Rationale 
The CARD Act requires institutions of higher education to 
“publicly disclose any contract or other agreement made with a 
card issuer or creditor for the purpose of marketing a credit 
card.”91 In addition to colleges publicly disclosing these 
agreements, credit card companies are required to provide to 
Congress any agreements they have with colleges.92 This 
obligation requires disclosure of agreements beyond just those 
that market cards to young consumers, as long as students are 
possible targets. The Federal Reserve has clarified: “An 
agreement may qualify as a college credit card agreement even if 
marketing of cards under the agreement is targeted at alumni, 
                                                                                                     
 89. See 155 CONG. REC. S5474 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Sherrod Brown) (“[M]any credit card companies flood campuses with deceptive 
advertising and hidden fees and penalties and unscrupulous practices.”). 
 90. See Nelson, Young Consumer Protection, supra note 9, at 375 
(describing the CARD Act as a recent effort by lawmakers “to address young 
consumers’ escalating indebtedness”); id. at 396–97 (stating a great concern of 
lawmakers enacting the CARD Act was the “detrimental consequences due 
to . . . accumulation of credit card debt” by college students). 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 1650(f)(1) (2011). 
 92. See id. § 1637(r)(2) (requiring each creditor to submit an annual report 
describing all college agreements and explaining the details of such reports). 
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faculty, staff, and other nonstudent consumers, as long as cards 
may also be issued to students in connection with the 
agreement.”93  
Several academics have argued that agreements between 
colleges and credit card companies have engendered students’ 
debt problems. Because of the financial incentives credit card 
issuers offer to schools and university officials, academics have 
argued that college administrations were willing to lead their 
students into debt to capture the issuers’ incentives.94 As Robert 
Manning argues: 
This Faustian pact includes sponsoring school programs, 
funding student activities, renting on-campus solicitation 
tables, and paying “kickbacks” for exclusive marketing 
agreements such as college or alumni affinity credit cards. As 
a result, rather than protecting the economic and educational 
interests of their students, college administrators are playing 
an active and often disingenuous role in promoting the societal 
acceptance of consumer debt as well as the prominence of 
credit cards in college life.95 
From the college’s perspective, some researchers argued, it is 
better for students to be in debt.96 Similarly, members of 
Congress believed that the relationship between credit card 
companies and universities led to perverse incentives to facilitate 
debt.97  
Members of Congress also emphasized the importance of this 
provision to provide “transparency in university marketing deals 
with credit card issuers.”98 Senator Feinstein went further, 
                                                                                                     
 93. Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7756 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).  
 94. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 162 (“[M]any college administrators are 
willing to sacrifice the long-term interests of their students and their 
institutions for the short-term financial inducements of the credit card 
industry.” (citation omitted)). 
 95. Id. at 192. 
 96. See Roberts & Jones, supra note 21, at 234 (describing how a school 
earns money from credit cards on campus and stating that “it is now in the 
school’s best interest for its students to be in debt”). 
 97. See 155 CONG. REC. H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Jeff Duncan) (“[M]any universities . . . have entered into deals with credit card 
companies, and now they are not only encouraging students to incur huge 
student loan debts, they’re encouraging students to incur credit card debts.”). 
 98. 155 CONG. REC. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
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arguing that requiring transparency may “act as a deterrent to 
deals with highly unfavorable terms for students.”99 Part IV.C 
uses my study of 300 of these college–issuer agreements to 
evaluate whether this prediction materialized. The CARD Act’s 
disclosure requirement is a significant change because attempts 
to obtain information about these agreements were stymied in 
the past because the agreements forbid the parties from 
disclosing their terms.100  
2. Assessing the Rationale for the College–Issuer Disclosures 
Because the CARD Act requires issuers and college-related 
entities to disclose their agreements, we now have the information 
needed to see whether this disclosure requirement was justified in 
the first place. The information we obtained from our sample of 
300 agreements suggests that some of the concerns animating the 
disclosure requirement were justified. On the other hand, our 
findings suggest that other concerns appear to be overstated.  
First, concerns about college-related entities promoting 
student use of credit cards are well-founded. The agreements 
envision, for the most part, students obtaining credit cards because 
of the agreements. Of all the agreements, 72.67% include student 
cards, while the remaining 27.33% are aimed exclusively at alumni 
or other groups. 
In addition, the agreements create an easy mechanism for 
issuers to use to reach students. Many of the agreements, 68.33%, 
require that the college-related entity provide a list of mailing 
addresses for students. This percentage is significantly higher 
than information reported before the CARD Act disclosures.101 An 
                                                                                                     
Dianne Feinstein); see also 155 CONG. REC. E1035 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) 
(statement of Rep. Thomas Petri) (“Despite the fact that hundreds of schools 
throughout the country have such arrangements, very little is known about 
them . . . . This bill simply seeks greater transparency by requiring credit card 
companies to report these arrangements.”). 
 99. 155 CONG. REC. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein). 
 100. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 30 (describing how 
attempts to uncover information about credit card college–issuer agreements 
failed because alumni association officials stated that “their contracts with the 
credit card issuers precluded disclosure of the terms and conditions”). 
 101. See CHERYL HYSTAD & BRAD HEAVNER, GRADUATING INTO DEBT: CREDIT 
THE CARD ACT ON CAMPUS 1501 
agreement between Dickinson College (DC) and MBNA America 
provides a common, albeit circuitous, provision. It states: “Upon 
the request of MBNA America, DC shall provide MBNA America 
with [m]ailing [l]ists free of any charge.”102 Mailing lists are 
defined as “updated and current lists and/or magnetic tapes (in a 
format designated by MBNA America) containing names, postal 
addresses and, when available, telephone numbers of [m]embers 
segmented by zip codes or reasonably selected membership 
characteristics.”103 The definition of “members” explicitly includes 
students: “‘Member’ means undergraduate students, graduate 
students, alumni of Dickinson College and/or other potential 
participants mutually agreed to by DC and MBNA America.”104 
Thus, while the agreement does not come out and say so, it 
requires the college to provide students’ addresses to the credit 
card issuer.  
In addition to student mailing lists, the agreements provide 
issuers with other advertising rights. Around half of the 
agreements, 47.33% (n=142), did not list any specific advertising 
the entity would provide or participate in. For the other half, Table 
3 outlines the specific advertising arrangements between issuers 
and college-related entities. 
                                                                                                     
CARD MARKETING ON MARYLAND COLLEGE CAMPUSES 8–9 (2004), available at 
http://www.marylandconsumers.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=x4_rQermn7Y%3
d&tabid=72 (reporting two of twelve schools interviewed admitted they sold 
student information to credit card companies and three of twelve schools 
surveyed sold a student list in some form). 
 102. Credit Card Agreement, Dickinson C.-MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., § 2(e), 
Aug. 6, 1996, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreements 
Content/CollegeAgreement_253.pdf. 
 103. Id. § 1(e). 
 104. Id. § 1(f). In the other 31.67% of the agreements, the addresses on 
mailing lists are limited to nonstudents. Alabama State University’s (ASU’s) 
agreement, for instance, states: 
ASU shall provide the initial [m]ailing [l]ist, containing at least thirty 
thousand (30,000) non-duplicate alumni names (of persons at least 
eighteen years of age) as well as additional names of donors and 
parents of students, with corresponding valid postal addresses and, 
when available, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of Alumni 
Members as soon as possible but no later than thirty (30) days after 
ASU’s execution of this Agreement. 
Alabama State University Affinity Agreement, supra note 50, § 2(e). 
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Table 3: Advertising Arrangements Between Issuers and College-
Related Entities 







Issuer permitted to advertise 
on entity’s website 90.51% 143 
Issuer permitted to solicit 
customers and/or have 
advertisements at sporting 
events or other major events 
29.11% 46 
College-related entity will 
send e-mails recommending 
the issuer 
8.86% 14 
College-related entity will 
include credit card 
applications in organization 
magazines, newspapers or e-
newsletters 
3.80% 6 
Issuer will provide credit 
education on campus (e.g., in 
student welcome kits, at 
orientation events, in the 
student newspaper or in the 
campus book store) 
2.53% 4 
In addition to the arrangements in Table 3, two agreements 
stated that the college-related entity would place banner 
advertisements for issuers, two stated that the issuer would be 
promoted in materials at the alumni office or at alumni meetings, 
and one stated that the issuer could place information in store 
publications. Yale University’s agreement with Chase Bank USA 
provides an example of the two most common provisions: 
Yale shall prominently place a jpeg image with an associated 
hyperlink above the fold on the homepage, and shall use 
                                                                                                     
 105. These percentages add up to more than 100% because some agreements 
provided issuers with multiple advertising rights. 
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reasonable efforts to obtain placement on the checkout or 
point-of-sale pages, if any, of the Association of Yale Alumni 
(AYA) Web site (www.aya.yale.edu), and shall prominently 
place a link on the sponsor page of the Yale Athletics Web 
site . . . .106 
Consistent with Schedule 3(a), Yale shall also provide or cause 
to be provided to Chase, at no cost to Chase, with access to 
each Yale home athletic event identified on Schedule 3(a) to 
market the Program . . . . Yale shall provide a location that is 
prominent with respect to visibility and pedestrian foot 
traffic.107 
Based on the fact that most agreements are aimed at putting 
credit cards in the hands of students and that most agreements 
actively involve the school in distributing the means for 
advertising those cards, policymakers’ concerns about the 
entanglement of college-related entities and credit card issuers 
appear justified. 
Yet, in some ways, the agreements are not as problematic as 
people imagined. First, the terms outlined in the agreements do 
not have the most abusive characteristics critics associate with 
credit cards. For instance, none of the 300 agreements we 
reviewed created cards with teaser rates, a common credit card 
snare that consumer advocates and academics criticize.108 
Additionally, the rates established by the agreement are not 
extremely high considering the nonexistent credit histories of 
many students. The median rate in our sample was 13.15%, but 
most credit cards have much higher effective rates, especially for 
poor credit risks.109  
Second, the agreements do, for the most part, give the school 
the right to approve of any advertising the issuer does pursuant 
to the agreement. Again, Alabama State University’s affinity 
                                                                                                     
 106. Affinity Bankcard Agreement, Chase Bank USA, N.A.-Yale U, § 4(b), 
Aug. 19, 2007, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCard 
AgreementsContent/CollegeAgreement_1009.pdf. 
 107. Id. § 4(c). 
 108. Teaser rates are short-term introductory interest rates. See generally 
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1392–93 (2004). 
 109. See MANN, supra note 8, at 190 (stating that higher-risk, higher-
default-rate borrowers often have higher interest rates); MANNING, supra note 8, 
at 218 (citing some examples of credit card interest rates, including 19.8 APR 
and 21.9 APR). 
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agreement provides a common example: “ASU shall have the 
right of prior approval of all [p]rogram advertising and 
solicitation materials to be used by MBNA America, which 
contain ASU’s [t]rademark; such approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed.”110 Most of the agreements, 
96.00% (n=288), contained a provision giving the school-related 
entity the right to approve ads, while the remaining 12 
agreements simply did not address approval of advertising. As 
long as college-related entities exercise strong judgment in 
approving advertisements, these provisions provide a check on 
abusive marketing behavior. 
Third, and most importantly, the relatively small amount of 
money paid to each college-related entity undermines one of the 
key rationales behind requiring disclosures by colleges. Prior 
research, which did not have the benefit of the disclosures 
required by the CARD Act, appears to have overstated the extent 
to which colleges have benefitted from marketing agreements. 
Based on the Federal Reserve System’s aggregation of the data 
provided by issuers in 2009,111 604 of the college-related entities, 
or 57.85%, made less than $10,000 under their agreements with 
issuers, with 219 making less than $1,000 and 99 making no 
money at all. The median payment amount was $5,891. Thus, for 
most organizations, their agreement with the issuer had a 
negligible effect on their bottom line. If it is true that credit card 
debt causes students to withdraw from school and cease paying 
tuition,112 it seems most schools have a lot more to lose if students 
are over-indebted than they have to gain by encouraging students 
to use credit cards.  
For a small minority of entities, however, the agreements 
were lucrative. In 2009, 143 entities made more than $100,000 
from their arrangement with issuers, and 25 entities obtained 
even more than $1,000,000. For these schools, it appears there 
may be an incentive to encourage credit card use. Overall, 
                                                                                                     
 110. Alabama State University Affinity Agreement, supra note 50, § 2(d). 
 111. The figures in the remainder of this section are all based on my 
analysis of the Federal Reserve’s spreadsheet. See FRB 2009 Full Data 
Spreadsheet, supra note 43. 
 112. See Small CLAIMS, supra note 66, at 7 (“This is a terrible thing. We 
lose more students to credit card debt than academic failure.” (quoting an 
Indiana University administrator)). 
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however, the data from the Federal Reserve indicate that the link 
between college–issuer agreements and over-indebtedness is not 
as clear as prior research had supposed. 
Along these same lines, it appears that most agreements did 
not result in a substantial number of credit card accounts being 
opened. Of all the agreements, 87.36% (n=912 of 1044) of the 
agreements resulted in fewer than 100 new credit card accounts 
being opened. The median number of cards opened pursuant to 
an agreement was 14. These data demonstrate that the idea that 
these agreements were causing students at most schools to open 
accounts and take on excessive debt is not true. The next section 
takes up the other key rationale behind the CARD Act—excessive 
student credit card debt. 
D. Misplaced Reliance on Credit Card Usage and Debt Levels 
The primary motivating factor behind each of the young 
consumer provisions was the belief that students were incurring 
substantial debt loads that caused them to experience financial 
distress. A large part of the basis for this concern is a series of 
studies113 by Sallie Mae, a financial services organization focused 
on education,114 and Nellie Mae, a Sallie Mae subsidiary, which 
                                                                                                     
 113. Nellie Mae began producing reports in 1998, but then Sallie Mae took 
over. Together, they have produced five reports. For the most recent report, see 
SALLIE MAE, HOW UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS USE CREDIT CARDS: SALLIE MAE’S 
NATIONAL STUDY OF USAGE RATES AND TRENDS 2009 [hereinafter SALLIE MAE 
STUDY], available at http://www.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/0BD600F1-9377-
46EA-AB1F-6061FC763246/10744/SLMCreditCardUsageStudy41309FINAL2. 
pdf. 
 114. See id. at 2 (describing Sallie Mae); see also Sallie Mae, Corporate 
Overview, https://www1.salliemae.com/about/corp_leadership (last visited Sept. 
24, 2012) (“Sallie Mae (NASDAQ: SLM) is the nation’s No. 1 financial services 
company specializing in education . . . . Sallie Mae turns education dreams into 
reality for its 25 million customers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
Sallie Mae is the nation’s leading provider of saving- and paying-for-
college programs. The company manages $180 billion in educational 
loans and serves 10 million student and parent customers. Through 
its . . . affiliates, the company also manages more than $17.5 billion in 
529 college-savings plans, and is a major, private source of college 
funding contributions in America with 10 million members and more 
than $475 million in member rewards. 
SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 2. 
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focuses on student loans.115 This subpart outlines the findings of 
the Sallie Mae/Nellie Mae studies, focusing on the most recent 
study, and explores how academics, the press, and policymakers 
commonly misused those findings.  
The concern over the Sallie Mae/Nellie Mae studies might 
appear parochial or merely interesting to academics only, but it is 
not. Every day when a member of Congress argued for the CARD 
Act’s young consumer provisions, they appealed to the figures in 
these studies116 (except one instance when the young consumer 
provisions were just mentioned in passing).117 It is hard to 
overstate the extent to which these reports have been misused.  
Although there are some differences, the most recent Sallie 
Mae study is similar in most ways to the prior reports from Nellie 
Mae.118 In the most recent study, Sallie Mae pulled data from 
1,200 credit bureau reports of students who had applied for 
private student loans with Nellie Mae or Sallie Mae.119 The Sallie 
Mae study finds that many students who apply for private loans 
have credit cards and that many of these students have high debt 
loads: 
                                                                                                     
 115. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 2 (“Since 1982, Nellie Mae 
has focused exclusively on providing education financing for undergraduate and 
graduate students and families, through the Federal Family Education Loan 
Program and through privately funded loans . . . . Nellie Mae is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of SLM Corporation, commonly known as Sallie Mae.”); see also 
Nellie Mae, About Us, http://nelliemae.com/aboutus (last visited Sept. 24, 2009) 
(providing background on the company) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 116. See 155 CONG. REC. S5469 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Byron Dorgan) (citing to statistics from the Sallie Mae/Nellie Mae study); 155 
CONG. REC. S5411 (daily ed. May 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) 
(citing to statistics from the study); 155 CONG. REC. S5316 (daily ed. May 11, 
2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (citing to statistics from the study); 
155 CONG. REC. H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Louise 
Slaughter) (citing to statistics from the study); 155 CONG. REC. S3552–53 (daily 
ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Murray) (citing to statistics from 
the study and introducing into the record a newspaper article that discussed 
similar figures); 155 CONG. REC. S175 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Herb Kohl) (citing to statistics from the study). 
 117. See 155 CONG. REC. S5549 (daily ed. May 18, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Byron Dorgan) (discussing the young consumer provision in 112 words). 
 118. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 4 (explaining the differences 
between the current and prior reports). 
 119. See id. at 19 (explaining the study’s methodology, including the sample 
group). 
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Eighty-four percent of this student population overall have 
credit cards, an increase of approximately 11 percent since the 
fall of 2004, the last time the undergraduate study was 
conducted . . . . Data collected in March 2008 show that the 
average (mean) amount of debt carried by undergraduate 
student cardholders increased from 2004 by 46 percent to 
$3,173. During the same time period, median debt increased 
by 74 percent to $1,645. The average number of cards carried 
per cardholder, those carrying four or more cards, and those 
with balances in the $3,000 to $7,000 range also increased.120 
Based on these numbers, the study concludes that “[i]n this time 
of credit crunch and economic downturn, college students are 
relying on credit cards more than ever before.”121  
There are two problems with how the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae 
data are commonly used, the first of which has been suggested by 
other researchers and the second of which I raise here for the 
first time.122 First, as others have noted, the Nellie Mae/Sallie 
Mae studies only reflect a small, unique group of students, not 
college students generally.123 The studies used the credit reports 
of students who applied for private student loans, not even the 
government-subsidized loans to which most students turn first to 
finance their education.124 It is not a stretch to think that this 
group would have higher debt loads than the general population 
of college students because students apply for private student 
loans when government-subsidized loans are insufficient.125 A 
                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. Id. at 3. 
 122. These studies have been significantly misused, but this misuse does not 
reflect negatively on the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae studies themselves, which note 
the methodological limitations. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“Eighty-four percent of this 
student population overall have credit cards . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 123. Staten & Barron, supra note 22, at 11 n.17. 
Although the Nellie Mae study was based on actual credit report data 
for its sample of students, the sample itself was biased. Students in 
the sample were applying for a special type of student loan because 
they did not qualify for more conventional student loans due to either 
excessive debt or incomes that exceeded qualifying thresholds. 
 124. See SALLIE MAE & GALLUP, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE 42 (2010), 
available at https://www1.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/D5D78A1C-BBB8-4D97-
AE9B-7EC35558AD5F/13388/SLMGallupReportHowAmericaPaysforCollege810 
10FINAL.pdf (noting that 28% of students pay for college with federal student 
loans but only 13% pay using private student loans). 
 125. See Staten & Barron, supra note 22, at 11 n.17 (“Students in the 
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separate study Sallie Mae and Gallup conducted, which was 
representative of all college students, found that only 13% of 
students borrowed using private student loans.126 More 
significantly, students borrowing private loans reported “a higher 
average cost of attendance compared to other borrowers,”127 and 
all students who borrowed “were more likely to attend four-year 
schools.”128 Both of these characteristics of private borrowers 
increase the pressure to pay for expenses with credit cards.  
This pressure to use credit cards to pay higher education 
expenses is revealed by the average amount of credit card debt 
used to pay for two-year versus four-year colleges. Student credit 
cards accounted for $70 of the debt for two-year public schools, 
$86 of the debt for public four-year colleges, and $200 of the debt 
for private four-year colleges.129 Thus, it is very likely that Sallie 
Mae’s student debt levels are higher than the typical college 
student’s debt levels, thereby reflecting only a small subset of 
college students, not students generally. 
A second concern that has escaped the attention of prior 
commentators is that Nellie Mae and Sallie Mae include together 
all debt that the student and any cosigners owe in “student debt 
levels,” not just the debt that the student individually owes. If a 
parent adds a student to one of the parent’s existing credit card 
accounts when the student leaves for college, the Nellie 
Mae/Sallie Mae studies would count the parent’s entire credit 
balance on that card as a “student debt” in its study because that 
debt shows up on the student’s credit report as a current 
obligation.130 
                                                                                                     
sample were applying for a special type of student loan because they did not 
qualify for more conventional student loans due to either excessive debt or 
incomes that exceeded qualifying thresholds.”). 
 126. See SALLIE MAE & GALLUP, supra note 124, at 42. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 26 tbl.2c. 
 130. See e-mail from Patricia Christel, Vice President, Corporate Commc’ns, 
Sallie Mae, to Jim Hawkins, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Hous. Law 
Ctr. (Jan. 3, 2011) (explaining the process by which the study’s credit card debt 
figures are taken directly from students’ credit reports and stating that these 
figures are generally higher than the debt levels self-reported by students) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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The exact effect of including cosigner debts is not known, but 
we do know that some parents deal with student credit cards by 
adding students to the parents’ accounts.131 If a parent with a 
$15,000 balance on a credit card adds a new student to the 
account, most people would not consider the student’s credit card 
debt load to be $15,000, but that is how the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae 
studies characterize the debt. Like using a subset of college 
students who applied for private loans, this inclusion of cosigner 
debts has the potential to artificially inflate student debt levels in 
the studies.  
The surveys I conducted at the University of Houston and 
Baylor University yielded very different results than the Nellie 
Mae/Sallie Mae studies. My study did not attempt to be 
nationally representative,132 so it also does not offer definitive 
proof about levels of credit card use or debt among all college 
students.133 Still, the fact that my study, which drew from all 
undergraduate students, generated such divergent results 
indicates that the driving factor behind Sallie Mae’s high credit 
card use and debt levels is a limited sample. Figure 3 contrasts 
the number of students with a credit card in the Sallie Mae study 
with the Houston/Baylor surveys. 
  
                                                                                                     
 131. See, e.g., Gabe Albarian, How Can College Students Avoid Credit 
Hassles? Expert Reveals Secrets to Establishing and Keeping Good Credit, 
MARKETWIRE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/how-
can-college-students-avoid-credit-hassles-1561884.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 
2012) (suggesting that students should be added to parents’ accounts until the 
students can accumulate sufficient credit history) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 132. See supra Part II.A (describing the study’s sample).  
 133. In another nationally representative study, however, Troy Adams and 
Monique Moore found that “[o]nly 8.2% and 5% [of more than 45,000 students] 
had a credit card balance of $1,000 to $2,999 or a balance of $3,000 or more, 
respectively.” Adams & Moore, supra note 16, at 103. 
1510 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1471 (2012) 
Figure 3: Comparison of Number of Students with Credit Cards 
Between Sallie Mae and Houston/Baylor Surveys 
 
Similarly, Table 4 compares Sallie Mae’s data about debt levels 
with the data from the Houston/Baylor study. 
Table 4: Comparison of Credit Card Debt Levels Between Sallie 
Mae and Houston/Baylor Studies  
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These results are consistent with the observation that 
students at private schools are more likely to have credit cards 
                                                                                                     
 134. The data in this table has been compiled from the Sallie Mae report. 
See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 3, 8 (providing the median freshman 
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and higher debt loads.135 But, in every case, my survey found 
significantly lower debt levels than Sallie Mae’s report. 
Academics, the media, and consumer advocates have 
repeatedly misused the data when making arguments in favor of 
specific regulatory reforms. More alarming, however, is the fact 
that every time a member of Congress mentioned the Sallie Mae 
study in conjunction with arguments for the CARD Act’s young 
consumer provisions, the member inappropriately used the 
findings as representative of all college students.136  
This chronic misuse of the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae studies 
needs to be corrected to ensure that optimal student-card policies 
are enacted. By pointing out the inaccuracies in the ways that 
academics and legislators currently use the studies, I do not 
intend to show that student credit cards are benign. Indeed, I 
have argued at length elsewhere that credit cards cause financial 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Manning & Kirshak, supra note 35, at 41 (“The highest proportions 
[of students with credit cards] are at more affluent, private universities and the 
lowest in predominantly minority colleges and public universities that enroll 
high percentages of students from lower income households.”). But see Norvilitis 
et al., Personality Factors, supra note 21, at 1404 (reporting students in that 
study at state schools had higher debt loads than students at private schools). 
 136. To locate instances where members of Congress used the Nellie 
Mae/Sallie Mae studies in conjunction with the CARD Act, I searched Westlaw’s 
“Congressional Record” database using the follow search command on January 
21, 2012: “(sallie-mae or nellie-mae) /50 credit-card”. It generated twenty-six 
results, but only five results involved the CARD Act; the other twenty-one were 
about other issues. In each case, the member of Congress misrepresented the 
studies’ findings. See 155 CONG. REC. H5814 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (statement 
of Rep. Earl Blumenauer) (“A recent Sallie Mae survey indicated that 84% of 
undergraduates had at least one credit card and that, on average, students have 
4.6 credit cards.”); 155 CONG. REC. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statements of 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (stating a number of figures from the Sallie Mae report 
as though they represent all students and using them as evidence of a need for 
Congress to take action); 155 CONG. REC. S5316 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) 
(statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“According to Sallie Mae, college students 
graduate with an average credit card debt of more than $4,000. That is up from 
$2,900 just 4 years ago. Nearly 20 percent of college students have credit card 
balances of over $7,000.”); 155 CONG. REC. H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) 
(statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter) (stating a number of Sallie Mae statistics 
as though they represent all students and rationalizing credit card debt as a 
reason for an increase in bankruptcy filings among young people); 155 CONG. 
REC. E1026 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Patrick Murphy) 
(blaming college credit card agreements for students’ “racking up debts that can 
take years to pay off,” and citing a “recent Sallie Mae study” as proof that 
graduating seniors have, on average, “more than $4,100 in credit card debt”). 
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distress.137 Yet, if we really want to protect students who use 
credit cards, we need to use the information appropriately. Also, 
if legislators have incorrect beliefs about the sources of student 
debt problems, they may enact policies aimed at the wrong credit 
vehicles. For instance, perhaps if legislators had better data on 
the true amount of credit card debt, they would focus more 
attention on reforming student loans.138 Additionally, with a 
better understanding of debt loads, policymakers might be able to 
determine the average optimal amount of credit card debt for 
students and enact rules that limit balances at those levels.139 
IV. Measuring the Effectiveness of the CARD Act’s Young 
Consumer Provisions 
The prior Part explored the pre-CARD Act era—the reasons 
for the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions, the flaws in those 
rationales, and the provisions themselves. This Part looks at the 
world after the CARD Act and reports data that measure the 
effects of the CARD Act for each of its provisions.  
A. The Effects of the Ability-to-Pay Provision 
The provisions requiring credit card companies to evaluate 
young consumers’ abilities to repay their debt have generated a 
variety of predictions. Some people have claimed that the CARD 
Act will eliminate access to credit because its ability-to-repay 
                                                                                                     
 137. See generally Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the 
Link Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011) 
(surveying the evidence that links credit cards and financial distress). 
 138. See Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in Past 
Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A14 (detailing an increase in student loan 
default rates from 7% to 8.8% in a single year). 
 139. Congresswoman Louise Slaughter offered an amendment to the CARD 
Act with caps on the amount of debt students could accumulate, but these 
amendments did not make it into the final Act. See Bill Swindell, House Close 
To Passage Of Maloney Credit Card Measure, NAT’L JS. CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 
30, 2009, at 6 (describing Maloney’s and Slaughter’s proposed amendments, and 
explaining that Slaughter’s amendment would set standards for underwriting 
student cards, including limiting the available credit to the greater of 20% of 
income or $500 per month).  
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standard is too strict.140 Others, however, have asserted that the 
Act will not stop anyone who wants a credit card from obtaining 
one because the standards are too lenient.141 This section 
analyzes these and other predictions with the findings of my 
student surveys. My research resolves this apparent 
contradiction in the current literature on ability to repay by 
revealing how the CARD Act’s standards appear strict but 
actually contain many loopholes that students have discovered 
and exploited. I discovered that students have found creative 
ways to avoid the strictures of the independent-ability-to-pay 
provisions, although they have not enlisted peers as cosigners as 
many observers expected.  
According to the survey results, not many students under the 
age of twenty-one had applied for a card since the beginning of 
the school year, creating a relatively small sample size in this 
limited demographic. Of the total sample of students under 
twenty-one, 11.05% (n=44) had applied for a card in the semester 
before the survey was taken. Three students erroneously failed to 
complete the detailed questions about their application, leaving 
forty-one students. Of those forty-one students, 56.09% (n=23) 
applied by themselves, and 43.90% (n=18) applied with a 
cosigner. Although the sample size is small, the results are 
interesting and touch on many of the empirical questions debated 
among the CARD Act’s opponents and proponents.  
1. Qualifying as an Individual 
Scholars raised a variety of concerns about loopholes around 
the provisions requiring young consumers to show an 
                                                                                                     
 140. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 424 (“The upshot is that independently 
wealthy eighteen-year-olds, or those whose parents are willing and able to 
accept joint liability, will still be able to obtain a credit card. But poor and 
middle-income applicants may not.” (citation omitted)); Wood, supra note 9, at 
172–74 (arguing that the standards for ability to repay are more stringent on 
those under twenty-one than on those over twenty-one and, therefore, this will 
prevent young consumers from building credit histories).  
 141. See Nelson, Young Consumer Protection, supra note 9, at 402–03 
(“Considering the likelihood that young consumers will have little trouble 
meeting the CARD Act’s eligibility requirements as interpreted by the Federal 
Reserve Board, the door remains open for college-aged consumers to continue 
amassing significant amounts of debt.”). 
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independent ability to repay the debt if they apply by themselves, 
and responses to my survey indicate those concerns were valid. 
Part of the problem is that the concept of a student’s “income” 
eludes simple definition.142 For instance, several sources have 
suggested the possibility that young consumers could use loan 
proceeds as income to obtain a credit card, although none of these 
sources offer evidence of this phenomenon.143 In my survey, I 
found that 27.27% (n=6) of students under twenty-one who were 
applying by themselves listed loans as part of their income to 
qualify for the credit card. If we also include students over 
twenty-one, 30.56% (n=11) listed loan proceeds as part of their 
income. While the number of students in this category is small, 
this finding demonstrates that concerns about using one type of 
debt to qualify for another type of debt are plausible. 
Another problem I discovered through the surveys was the 
extent to which students used money from their family as their 
income or assets to qualify for a credit card. Of the students 
under twenty-one who applied by themselves, 34.78% (n=8) listed 
money from relatives as income. For those who hoped the CARD 
Act would ensure young consumers could pay their debts on their 
own, this number is troubling. 
Finally, in general, students did not use earned wages as 
income as often as proponents of the Act had hoped. Of the 
students under twenty-one applying for a card on their own, 
68.42% (n=13)144 reported having income below $10,000 a year, 
and only 45.45% (n=10) listed income as the sole means for 
obtaining a card. More surprising, only 52.27% (n=12) stated that 
they used earned income at all to qualify for the card, with the 
remainder relying on other sources. 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Joo et al., supra note 24, at 418 (“College students’ income is hard 
to measure because the definition of income varies from student to student.”). 
 143. See Nelson, Schoolhouse to Poorhouse, supra note 9, at 28 (“Moreover, if 
this incoming student takes out student loans to fund his or her educational 
expenses, these loans can be treated as ‘income’ to independently qualify for a 
card—a disconcerting practice that some student consumers have already begun 
to implement.” (citation omitted)); Susan Tompor, Credit Card Offers Still 
Contain Trouble Spots for Consumers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 30, 2010, at 
B4 (noting that “students [are] reporting a college loan as ‘income’ and some 
card issuers [are] accepting that claim”). 
 144. Some respondents did not answer this question, which changes the 
number and percentage ratios. 
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Overall, these statistics paint a disturbing picture of the 
effectiveness of the ability-to-pay provision. The lenient 
requirements set up through Regulation Z have provided 
numerous ways to qualify for credit outside of actually being able 
to repay the debt. 
2. Cosigning 
Several news stories,145 academic articles,146 and a 
participant at an FDIC advisory meeting147 have raised the 
concern that the CARD Act would cause students to seek peer 
cosigners, but no data exist to confirm or refute this 
apprehension.148 Unlike fears about the inroads around the 
income or asset requirement, this fear appears misplaced, at least 
among the students I surveyed. Of the students under twenty-one 
who applied for a new card within the few months before 
completing the survey, 94.44% (n=17) used a parent as their 
                                                                                                     
 145. See David Migoya, College Students Duck New Credit-Card Law with 
Friends, LOWELL SUN (MASS.), Sept. 8, 2010 (discussing college students’ 
cosigning for one another in order to get credit cards after the new law); see also 
John C. Ninfo II, Commentary: An 18-Year-Old Needs a Credit Card?, DAILY 
REC. (ROCHESTER, N.Y.), Jan. 26, 2010 (“Another concern is that parents, family 
members or friends will not stop and think twice before co-signing for a credit 
card for a young person who cannot meet the ‘independent means’ test . . . .”); 
Tompor, supra note 143, at B4 (“[S]ome college students who are 18 or 19 are 
asking friends twenty-one or older to co-sign their credit card applications.”). 
 146. See Nelson, Schoolhouse to Poorhouse, supra note 9, at 32 (“[O]lder 
students, who may already have student loan and/or credit card debt, are 
permitted to sign if they meet the issuers’ requirements. There have already 
been reports of some college students paying older students and friends to serve 
as cosigners.” (citations omitted)); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 427 (“Some 
eighteen- to twenty-year-old students . . . simply ‘ask classmates or fraternity 
brothers to co-sign’ their credit card application, ‘sometimes for a small 
fee.’”(citations omitted)). 
 147. See Ted Beck, President & CEO, Nat’l Endowment for Fin. Educ., 
statement at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Meeting of the 
Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion to Discuss Children’s Savings and 
Underserved Studies (Nov. 16, 2010) (“[W]e just did a survey, and 61 percent of 
parents don’t want to co-sign their credit card. So what we’re finding—and I 
don’t have a statistic for this—but young adults are going to their friends and 
saying, ‘Would you co-sign for me?’ who are over 21.”). 
 148. See Migoya, supra note 145 (“There are few hard numbers on how the 
trend is developing, but enough anecdotal evidence that it’s beginning to creep 
upward.”). 
1516 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1471 (2012) 
cosigner, while one student had a sibling cosign. No students 
under the age of twenty-one reported having a friend or someone 
other than a parent or sibling cosign for them. 
One benefit of the CARD Act’s qualifications for young 
consumers is that it may have helped formalize the surety 
relationship that existed implicitly between many parents and 
their children. Of the students under twenty-one that I surveyed, 
31.33% (n=104) expected someone else, most likely their parents, 
to pay their credit card debt. Prior to the CARD Act’s 
requirements about young consumers having cosigners, parents 
may have been informally drafted into the debtor-creditor 
relationship. Indeed, several members of Congress expressed this 
concern when debating the CARD Act’s young-consumer 
provisions,149 and one academic has criticized the practice of 
credit card companies “exploiting familial ties to reach into the 
pockets of those with whom there is no formal contract.”150 
Findings in a study conducted by the Education Resources 
Institution and Institute for Higher Education Policy showed that 
63% of students obtained their first card without a cosigner.151 
That number is slightly higher than my study, in which 56.09% of 
students applied on their own, perhaps suggesting that the 
CARD Act is making cosigning more common. Although it is 
impossible to draw out any causal inferences with my survey’s 
data, the high number of parents listed as cosigners suggests that 
more parents will be formal, not merely informal, guarantors of 
student debt.  
                                                                                                     
 149. For instance, the CARD Act was originally introduced “to prevent credit 
card issuers from taking unfair advantage of college students and their parents.” 
155 Cong. Rec. S174 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) 
(emphasis added) (proposing to amend the TILA for the purpose of preventing 
this exploitation). 
 150.  Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities 
Influence the Relationship Between Americans, Business and Government, 5 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509, 528 (2010). 
 151. See EDUC. RES. INST. & INST. HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, CREDIT RISK OR 
CREDIT WORTHY? COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 9 (1998) (“A majority of 
students, 36%, received their credit cards by applying on their own.”). 
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3. Access to Credit 
One persistent criticism of the CARD Act’s restriction of 
access to credit cards has been that it will prevent those under 
twenty-one from getting credit cards,152 starting small 
businesses,153 establishing a credit history,154 or having access to 
an important source of credit.155 Also, some research suggests 
that borrowers may turn to alternative financial service providers 
if credit is unavailable.156 
In my survey, I asked whether students thought they needed 
a credit card to make purchases while they were in college. 
Students were less likely than some academics to think they 
needed credit cards. For students under twenty-one, only 38.85% 
(n=155) answered that they thought they needed a credit card. 
For students over twenty-one, the number jumped to 50.78% 
(n=65), but the CARD Act’s ability-to-repay requirements do not 
apply to that latter group.  
I did not ask about whether students had turned to fringe 
bankers for credit, but some evidence indicates that students are 
turning to these lenders. In general, fringe lenders have gained 
business because of the tightening of credit and stricter 
regulations.157 More pointedly, one fringe lender has stated in a 
                                                                                                     
 152. See Brian Burnsed, New Rules Place Barriers Between Students, Credit 
Card Issuers, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/ 
articles/2010/02/19/new-rules-place-barriers-between-students-credit-card-
issuers (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Peter Garuccio, a spokesman for the 
American Bankers Association, a banking lobby group, says, ‘It’s pretty clear 
that it will be tougher for people in this group to get credit cards. I think that 
you’ll probably see a decline in the number of cards in this segment.’”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 153. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 432 (“By categorically withholding credit 
cards from eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, section 301 seriously impedes their 
ability to start up a business.”). 
 154. See Wood, supra note 9, at 175 (stating that young people must build 
credit before they can buy cars or houses, and therefore, by preventing access to 
credit cards, the Act “hampers the ability of . . . eighteen- to twenty-one-year-
olds to become fully independent adult consumers”). 
 155. See Williams & Emley, supra note 9, at 1421–22 (noting that the rules 
could prevent a spouse from opening a credit card because of a lack of personal 
income or assets, even if the other spouse had substantial income and assets). 
 156. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 430–31 (listing possible alternatives to 
credit cards but also pointing out some problems with them). 
 157. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Payday Lenders Go Hunting, WALL ST. J., 
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public securities filing that the CARD Act has increased demand 
for its product: 
In some cases we believe regulatory changes have resulted in a 
constriction of the availability of unsecured credit for 
consumers with poor or no credit history (for example, the 
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 
which, among other things, disallowed the issuance of a credit 
card to anyone under 21 without a co-signer or proof of ability 
to repay and also curtailed the amount of fees that banks can 
assess on cardholders). The Company believes that this 
constriction in available sources of credit has resulted in, and 
will continue to result in, an increased demand for our 
services, which has produced a corresponding growth in our 
fee and interest income, as well as an increase in our need for 
employees and opportunities for opening new stores.158  
Whether this is a harmful or salutatory development is, of course, 
highly debatable, but it is worth noting that fringe credit 
products are generally much less likely than credit cards to cause 
borrowers to become over-indebted.159 Thus, if the Act is leading 
students to alternative financial service providers, it may be 
doing them a favor. 
B. The Effects of Restrictions on Marketing to Young Consumers 
As I mentioned in the introduction, legislators are proud of 
the effects that they think the CARD Act’s provisions on 
marketing are having. This subpart discusses data from my 
surveys about offers students had recently received and credit 
card marketing they had observed. I found that the number of 
students receiving offers through the mail and being subjected to 
                                                                                                     
Dec. 24, 2010 (“Payday lenders like Advance America are pushing hard to lure 
away customers from traditional banks. The effort is getting a boost from the 
industry’s loan crunch, especially for borrowers with blemished credit, and 
toughened regulation of fees and interest rates charged by the nation’s 7,760 
banks and savings institutions.”). 
 158. TMX Fin., LLC, Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Amendment No. 2 to Form S-4), at 30 (Apr. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1511966/000119312511102503/ds4a.htm 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 159. See Hawkins, supra note 137, at 1399–1402 (arguing that the structure 
of fringe credit transactions makes them difficult to link to financial distress). 
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marketing remains high. The number appears, however, to have 
decreased in the two years since the CARD Act was enacted. 
To understand the effects of the CARD Act’s provision on 
credit card marketing, I did not ask questions that tried to indict 
companies for breaking the law. For some provisions of the Act, 
this would be impossible because I could not measure how often, 
for instance, credit reporting agencies were giving information 
about young consumers to companies.160 More importantly, the 
real purpose of the Act was to decrease harmful advertising and 
student over-indebtedness, so the real measure of its 
effectiveness requires a larger consideration of its effects than 
mere compliance or noncompliance with the technical 
requirements of the law. 
1. Prescreened Mail Offers 
Commentary on the CARD Act has praised it for “protect[ing] 
students from insidious pre-screened offers with which they are 
consistently bombarded.”161 The truth, however, is much more 
nuanced. While it appears that the number of students reporting 
credit card offers has dropped, it remains quite high.  
I asked students whether they had “received any credit card 
offers in the mail since the beginning of” either 2010 or 2011, 
depending on the year I administered the survey. Overall, 68.92% 
(n=275) of students under twenty-one reported receiving credit 
card offers in the mail during the preceding year. Thus, a large 
majority of students were still subjected to marketing through 
mailed offers, despite the CARD Act going into effect in February 
2010. The number of students reporting offers, however, did 
decrease between 2010 and 2011. Of the students under twenty-
one, 76.13% (n=185) reported having received an offer in 2010, 
but only 57.69% (n=90) indicated they had received an offer in 
2011. 
The fact that students are still receiving card offers does not 
necessarily indicate that credit reporting agencies or credit card 
companies are violating the CARD Act. Instead, credit card 
                                                                                                     
 160. For a description of this provision, see supra Part III.B. 
 161. Wood, supra note 9, at 170. 
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companies are likely obtaining information for consumers who 
are under twenty-one from sources other than credit reporting 
agencies, such as “commercial mailing lists through memberships 
to music or book clubs, magazine subscriptions, or by completing 
sweepstakes entry cards.”162 As the study of agreements between 
college-related entities and credit card issuers in this Article 
found, 68.33% of such agreements require that the college-related 
entity provide the issuer with student addresses.163 Issuers do not 
rely exclusively on credit bureaus for student addresses, which 
undermines the successfulness of the CARD Act’s attempt to cut 
off offers. The CARD Act’s approach was purposefully indirect, 
but its circularity appears to have undermined its effectiveness.  
2. Marketing on and off Campus and Marketing Using Gifts 
To measure the effectiveness of the CARD Act’s provision 
forbidding issuers from offering tangible gifts to students, I asked 
about whether students had seen any credit card marketing on 
campus and off campus and not just about the specific marketing 
prohibited by the Act of offering tangible gifts. I asked the 
following questions: 
During your time in college, have you seen any credit card 
companies advertising ON or NEAR campus or at a student 
event? 
During your time in college, have you seen any advertising by 
credit card companies OFF campus that appears to be directed 
at college students? 
During your time in college, have you seen any credit card 
companies offering a gift (like a T-shirt or food) if you sign up 
for a credit card? 
I focused on marketing efforts in general because prior research 
indicates credit cards draw in students for a variety of reasons. In 
reporting on his extensive groundbreaking qualitative research, 
Robert Manning describes the reasons his interviewees were 
attracted to their credit cards. None of his interviewees report 
that gifts were important to cards’ appeal. Often just the 
                                                                                                     
 162. Warwick & Mansfield, supra note 72, at 621. 
 163. See infra Part IV.C. 
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advertisements were sufficient,164 and the motivation for some 
students was credit issuers’ appeals to responsible uses of open-
ended credit.165 Tangible gifts were “unnecessary.”166 Thus, I 
wanted to measure the overall effect of the Act on marketing 
activities, not a single subset of student marketing.  
I asked about whether students had seen credit card 
companies offering tangible gifts at all and not just offering 
tangible gifts on campus because I wanted to capture what effect 
the Act was having on tangible gifts whether on or off campus. 
First, issuers could easily evade regulations without having any 
meaningful effect on students’ experiences by offering gifts 1,001 
feet from campus.167 Second, issuers can reach students on 
campus with offers of tangible goods through electronic sources 
like e-mail or social media. Companies cannot mail offers of 
tangible goods,168 but because an e-mail address does not have a 
physical location, credit card companies can send solicitations 
offering tangible gifts to students sitting in their college dorm 
rooms on their school “.edu” e-mail addresses.169  
                                                                                                     
 164. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 172 (“Jeff’s first credit card was an 
impulsive response to a Citibank advertisement ‘that was hanging on the wall 
in the dorm.’”); id. at 178 (“‘I saw advertisements in the [student] newspaper, 
sign-up tables [in the student center], and applications [inserted] with my 
textbooks [from the bookstore].’”); id. at 181 (“Citibank Visa advertisements 
‘were plastered all over the university . . . .’”). 
 165. See id. at 175 (“He is most angered about how the credit card 
companies’ marketing literature on campus praises the benefits of ‘responsible 
use’ but neglects to inform impressionable and inexperienced students about the 
downside, such as the impact of poor credit reports on future loans and even 
potential employment.”). 
In order to stretch her limited resources, Kristin decided to get her 
own credit card, since she no longer had access to her parents’ plastic. 
The slogan “It pays to Discover” was appealing because the “no 
annual fee,” “build your own credit history,” and “cash back bonus” 
features satisfied her need for financial control. 
Id. at 188–89. 
 166. Id. at 190. 
 167. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.57(c)(3) (2012) (“A location that is within 1,000 feet 
of the border of the campus of an institution of higher education, as defined by 
the institution of higher education, is considered near the campus of an 
institution of higher education.”). 
 168. See id. § 226.57(c)(4) (clarifying the prohibition on inducement by 
stating that it includes mailing tangible goods to locations on or near campus).  
 169. See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7758 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (“An e-mail address does not physically exist 
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To measure the effect of the Act, I compared the responses to 
several questions about credit card marketing from students who 
had only been in college during the time the CARD Act was in 
effect with those who had been in college for at least some time 
before the Act’s effective date.170 If the CARD Act was being 
effective, I posited that students who had been in college only 
during the time in which the Act was in effect should report 
seeing credit card marketing at a substantially lower rate than 
students who had been in college both during the time the Act 
was in effect and the time it was not in effect.  
Of students who had only been in college while the CARD Act 
was in effect, 22.37% (n=68 of 304 students) reported seeing 
credit card companies marketing on campus, while 49.10% 
(n=109 of 222 students) of students who had been in school while 
the Act was not in effect reported seeing on-campus marketing 
efforts. This result is a statistically significant difference under 
the chi-squared test.171 Similarly, 67.21% (n=205 of 305 students) 
of students who had only been in college under the Act responded 
that they had seen credit card marketing off campus directed at 
students, while 81.07% (n=167 of 206) of those in school without 
the Act had observed this type of marketing.172 Finally, 40.33% 
(n=123 of 305 students) of students in school under the Act 
reported seeing credit card companies giving gifts to students, 
while 59.71% (n=123 of 206 students) in school without the Act 
reported this conduct.173 
These results are summarized in Figure 4:  
                                                                                                     
anywhere, and therefore, cannot be considered an address on or near campus.”). 
 170. For the first year I conducted the survey, I compared freshmen versus 
all other students, and for the second year, I compared freshmen and 
sophomores versus all other students since the Act had been in effect for two 
years. 
 171. χ2(1, N=524)=41.55, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.28. 
 172. χ2(1, N=524)=11.97, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.15. 
 173. χ2(1, N=524)=19.50, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.19. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of Students Reporting Credit Card 
Marketing 
 
In each case, it appears that the number of students observing 
marketing decreased by around 15–20% after the Act. This 
difference, however, could be attributed to being in school for a 
longer period of time and thus having more opportunities to see 
marketing activity than the effectiveness of the CARD Act’s 
provisions. In the first year I conducted the survey, 43.30% of 
sophomores reported seeing credit card marketing on campus, 
while 71.11% of seniors reported seeing credit card marketing on 
campus. Each of those groups had been in school while the CARD 
Act was not in effect, yet their answers differed by 30%. The chi-
squared test confirms that this difference between sophomores 
and seniors is unlikely to be a result of chance.174 Thus, while the 
numbers appear to suggest the Act is having an effect, I think 
that effect is unlikely to be attributable to the Act.  
The survey data do indicate, however, a decrease from 2010 
and 2011 in the marketing reported by respondents. Of all the 
freshmen surveyed in the first year I conducted the survey, 
32.19% had seen credit card companies marketing on campus, 
while only 12.20% of freshmen in the second year observed that 
marketing. The difference between the first and second year is 
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not attributable to adding a second school to my survey pool 
because the number of only University of Houston students 
reporting marketing on campus dropped to 15.25% in the second 
year of surveying. The number of freshmen reporting off-campus 
marketing dropped from 73.29% in the first year to 62.60% in the 
second year (or 64.41% if only University of Houston freshmen 
are included). Finally, the number of freshmen reporting 
companies handing out gifts decreased from 47.26% in the first 
year to 32.52% in the second year (or 25.42% if only University of 
Houston freshmen are included). 
Together with the responses to the questions about mailed 
offers, I summarize these results in Figure 5: 
Figure 5: Percentage of Freshmen Reporting Credit Card 
Marketing Over Two Years 
 
As depicted in Figure 5, it appears that for all categories, credit 
card marketing directed at students is declining, and this decline 
is statistically significant for all categories except mailed offers.175 
Thus, while the level of students reporting credit card marketing 
remains higher than proponents of the CARD Act may have 
                                                                                                     
 175. The chi-square test yielded the following results: for reports of mailed 
offers (X2(1, N=266)=2.82, p < 0.1, Cramér’s V=0.10); for reports of gifts (X2(1, 
N=266)=5.7, p < 0.05, Cramér’s V=0.15); for reports of on-campus marketing 
(X2(1, N=266)=16.74, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.25); for reports of off-campus 
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predicted, the trend of fewer students reporting instances of 
marketing suggests the Act may be effectively, although slowly, 
curbing such marketing. 
C. The Effects of the College–Issuer Marketing Agreements 
Provisions 
A variety of sources predicted before the Act passed that 
forcing issuers to disclose their agreements with colleges would 
affect the terms of those agreements.176 Others have since 
claimed that, in response to the Act, issuers are amending their 
agreements with organizations to remove marketing to 
students.177 Based on my study of the agreements between 
issuers and college-related entities, however, it appears that 
these predictions are wrong. 
The majority of agreements did not change at all between 
2009 and 2010, despite the fact that the CARD Act was passed in 
2009 and went into effect in February 2010. Of the 300 
agreements I studied, 64.33% (n=193) remained exactly the same 
in 2010 as they were in 2009, and for many agreements, the same 
as they had been for years before that. Only 1% of the agreements 
were first signed in 2009 or 2010.   
It does appear that more agreements were terminated or 
expired after the CARD Act went into effect, but it is impossible 
to tell whether this change is merely correlative or if the CARD 
                                                                                                     
 176. See 155 Cong. Rec. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein) (arguing that transparency might “act as a deterrent to deals 
with highly unfavorable terms to students”); see also Wood, supra note 9, at 171 
(“Exposing the agreements will not only increase public awareness about these 
practices but may also deter the more unconscionable aspects of these 
agreements.” (citation omitted)). 
 177. See James Goodman, Credit Card Companies Adapt to College Rules, 
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Nov. 1, 2010 (describing issuers’ new focus on 
alumni rather than current students). 
Given such restrictions, and with student loan debt at an all-time 
high, credit card companies have shifted their focus to alumni. Betty 
Riess, Bank of America spokeswoman, said in the past several years 
the bank has been amending several agreements to eliminate 
marketing to students. The bank has about 700 “collegiate affinity” 
agreements, she said, and 98 percent of open accounts are “non-
student.” 
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Act caused companies or college-related entities to end the 
agreements. For the agreements that were in effect at the start of 
2009, the study revealed that 24 of 300 were terminated or 
expired in that year, but in 2010, 63 were terminated or expired.  
The mere fact that the number of terminations increased, 
however, obviously does not mean the CARD Act caused the 
change. It appears from the documents associated with the 
agreements that all of the relationships ended in a normal course 
of events, either because the agreement was set to expire (18 
agreements) or the parties terminated the relationship pursuant 
to the agreement (45 agreements). Often, the issuer initiated the 
termination. Many of the termination letters followed this 
passage, taken from a letter from FIA Card Services to an 
organization, almost verbatim: 
I am writing to inform you that following a comprehensive 
review of the American Institute of Chemists, Inc. credit card 
program, FIA Card Services, N.A. (f/k/a MBNA America Bank, 
N.A.) (“FIA”) has decided to terminate our Amended and 
Restated Affinity Agreement dated as of July 13, 1994, as the 
same may have been amended ("Agreement”).178  
Administrative reviews and decisions such as these seem to have 
little to do with increased regulation. More than 70% of the 
agreements that were terminated generated less than $5,000 in 
2009 for the college-related entity, indicating a low activity level, 
and thus low profitability for the issuer.  
In only two cases in all of the 300 agreements that I reviewed 
did I observe any mention of regulations influencing the decision 
to end the arrangement. In one example from March 2009, before 
the CARD Act was actually passed, an agent of the Tulane 
University Alumni Association terminated its agreement with 
Bank of America, explaining: 
We have enjoyed our seven year affiliation with Bank of 
America and we have been satisfied with our relationship with 
the bank and especially with you as our account executive. 
Our termination is rather a sign of the economic times, the 
                                                                                                     
 178. Letter from Alex J. McLaughlin, Vice President, FIA Card Servs., N.A., 
to Sharon Dobson, Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Chemists, Inc. (Apr. 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreementsContent/ 
CollegeAgreement_1174.pdf. 
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increased projected scrutiny of university affinity programs 
and the mission-relatedness of these affinity arrangements.179   
Similarly, in November of 2008, just after the CARD Act was first 
introduced, an alumni group associated with the University of 
Houston indicated that regulatory pressure was influencing its 
decision to end the agreement: “We believe this program is 
counter to our mission to contact, engage, serve, empower and 
acknowledge UHCL alumni. We also made this decision out of 
appreciation for the pressures of credit and the frustration of 
mailings.”180 The fact that only two agreements among 300 
mention regulatory pressure suggests that based on outward 
appearances, the CARD Act has had a negligible effect on the 
number of agreement terminations. 
Like the number of terminations, changes to the agreements 
demonstrate little salutary effects from the CARD Act. Figure 6 
summarizes the changes that occurred in the 83 agreements that 
changed in 2010. 
                                                                                                     
 179. Letter from Charlotte B. Travieso, Dir., Office of Alumni Affairs, 
Tulane Alumni Ass’n, to Nazanin Rad, Bank of Am. Bus. Dev. (Mar. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreementsContent/ 
CollegeAgreement_25.pdf. 
 180. Letter from Charity Ellis, Dir. of Alumni & Cmty. Relations, Univ. of 
Hous. Clear Lake, to Peggy Fullett, Vice President, Bank of Am. (Nov. 6, 2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreementsContent/ 
CollegeAgreement_784.pdf. 
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Figure 6: Changes in College–Issuer Agreements After the CARD 
Act Went into Effect 
 
Twenty of the 300 agreements were amended in 2010. Of 
those 20 amendments, 60.00% (n=12) were ministerial or added 
provisions that likely have little effect on students’ experiences 
with the agreements, such as establishing a web portal to access 
accounts, extending the life of the agreement, or making small 
changes to the royalties. For 25.00% of the amendments (n=5), 
the changes were in line with the hopes of the CARD Act’s 
sponsors. For instance, in several agreements, students were 
omitted from the mailing lists that the college-related entity was 
obligated to provide or the issuer stopped paying any royalties for 
student accounts, taking away the incentive for the entity to 
promote them. For the other 15.00% (n=3) of the amendments, 
however, provisions were added that contradict the statute’s 
intent. Several agreements, for example, added an obligation that 
the college-related entity advertise for the issuer on its website, 
and others added students to those persons covered by the 
agreements. Thus, based on the continued stability of the number 
of college–issuer agreements and the fact that very few 
agreements changed to protect students from abuses, it appears 
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V. Conclusion: Lessons from the CARD Act’s Young 
Consumer Provisions 
The survey of students and study of college–issuer 
agreements in this Article have suggested that the CARD Act has 
not quelled marketing to young consumers or ensured that young 
consumers could repay their debts in the ways that proponents of 
the Act had hoped. Survey data demonstrate that students are 
using student loans to obviate the need to prove an ability to 
repay credit card debt. Responses to the survey also reveal that a 
high number of students are still receiving credit card offers in 
the mail and are still observing credit card issuers on and off 
campus targeting students with marketing, although the 
numbers appear to be declining. Similarly, requiring the 
disclosure of agreements between issuers and college-related 
entities has had almost no effect on either the number of those 
agreements or the terms of those agreements. 
These results are significant if policymakers want more from 
the CARD Act than a political victory. The empirical work in this 
Article offers the first measurement of the Act’s actual effects, 
and the reality is not as rosy of a picture as many of the 
predictions about the Act had painted. More work needs to be 
done to correct the inefficiencies in this market.  
Future attempts to establish student credit card policies need 
to adapt based on the lessons learned through the CARD Act. 
Primarily, several provisions of the CARD Act failed because they 
did not directly regulate the behavior that concerned 
policymakers. For instance, the provision forbidding credit 
bureaus from giving addresses for consumers under the age of 
twenty-one did not have the desired effect of curtailing credit 
card offers in the mail because it only addressed the problem 
tangentially. Instead, if Congress really wants to prevent offers in 
the mail, it could directly regulate the conduct, like it did to 
prevent junk faxes.181 If young consumers were given a private 
                                                                                                     
 181. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2011) (making it unlawful “for any person 
within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the 
recipient is within the United States—(C) to use any . . . device to send, to a 
telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement” without meeting the 
narrow exceptions in the statute). 
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cause of action against issuers who violated this provision,182 the 
number of students reporting instances of being mailed credit 
card offers would likely drop significantly.183 In the same way, if 
members of Congress want to alter the terms of agreements 
between issuers and college-related organizations, they could do 
so directly, instead of relying on disclosures to incentivize the 
parties to change the agreements.184 
A second way the CARD Act was misguided was its failure to 
appreciate and respond to the business incentive of establishing 
students as new credit card customers. Credit card companies 
have an enormous stake in gaining college students as 
customers.185 The strength of this incentive causes issuers to seek 
creative ways for penetrating the student-card market despite 
new regulations. As we have seen in a variety of markets, 
creditors are nimble in avoiding unwanted regulation.186 Because 
of this, a regulatory strategy that permits legitimate business 
purposes while minimizing harms to consumers is preferable. In 
the case of the CARD Act, the misuse of Sallie Mae’s figures on 
student debt likely led Congress to regulate with a supposed—
and inaccurate—harm in mind instead of legitimate harms.187 
Because the empirical work in this Article has removed this 
barrier, legislators should reconsider amendments to cap total 
balances on student cards. Such a regulation would allow issuers 
to pursue student customers and make credit cards available to 
students without the risk that students will be buried in debt.188 
                                                                                                     
 182. See, e.g., id. § 227(b)(3) (setting out a private cause of action for 
violations of the junk fax statute). 
 183. Cf. MANN, supra note 8, at 154 (suggesting “a ban on marketing 
directed at minors and college-age persons”). 
 184. See, e.g., Jill M. Norvilitis & Phillip Santa Maria, Credit Card Debt on 
College Campuses: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, 36 C. STUDENT J. 356, 
361 (2002) (suggesting “changing how fees are paid to colleges or student 
organizations” and providing the example that “if student groups received a flat 
fee for sponsoring a table rather than an amount per completed application, 
there might be less pressure on students to complete applications”). 
 185. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 167 (explaining the important role 
students play in maintaining credit card companies’ market share).  
 186. See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto 
Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012) (describing how title lenders 
have avoided usury rates to lend in many states). 
 187. See supra Part III.D. 
 188. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Rep. Slaughter’s 
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The harms that financial distress and misguidance cause to 
young consumers are important and require a regulatory 
response. In order to shape that response, however, we need to 
evaluate the empirical claims behind policy prescriptions and 
learn from the failures of the CARD Act. As policymakers take on 
the student debt crisis, these lessons can help establish optimal 
student credit policies. 
  
                                                                                                     
proposed amendments to the CARD Act that would have limited student 
balances). 
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Appendix A: The CARD Act Student Survey189 
Survey on the Effects of the CARD Act 
Contact: Asst. Professor Jim Hawkins, 713-743-5018 
Please circle your answer: 
1. How many years have you been attending any college 
full-time?  
A. This semester is my first year 
B. This is my second year 
C. This is my third year 
D. This is my fourth year 
E. I have been attending college for more than four years 
2. Are you under 21?  A. Yes  B. No 
3. What is your gender?  A. Male  B. Female 
4. What is your race? 
A. Non-Hispanic White 
B. Non-Hispanic Black/African American 
C. Latino 
D. Asian 
E. Other  
5. During your time in college, have you seen any credit 




6. During your time in college, have you seen any 
advertising by credit card companies OFF campus that 
appears to be directed at college students? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
                                                                                                     
 189. This survey is the version used in fall 2011 and spring 2012. The earlier 
version of the survey is identical except that the dates are changed and some of 
the language is aimed only at students at the University of Houston. 
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7. During your time in college, have you seen any credit 
card companies offering a gift (like a T-shirt or food) if 
you sign up for a credit card? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
8. Have you received any credit card offers in the mail 
since the beginning of 2011? 
A. Yes 
B. No 





E. More than 3 
10. Approximately how much do you currently owe on 





E. More than $3,000 
11. Do you expect to pay off these balances yourself or do 
you expect someone else will pay them off (like a parent)? 
A. I expect to pay them off 
B. I expect someone else will pay them off 
12. Do you think you need a credit card to make purchases 
during your time in college? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
13. Since you started school this Fall, have you opened a 
new credit card account? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
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ONLY ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF YOU HAVE OPENED A 
NEW CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT SINCE STARTING SCHOOL THIS FALL 
(I.E., YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 13). 
14. Did you apply for the new credit card by yourself or 
with a cosigner? 
A. By myself 
B. With a co-signer 
C. Not applicable 






F. Not applicable 
16. If you applied by yourself, what is your approximate 
annual income? 
A. Less than $10,000 a year 
B. $10,000 - $20,000 a year 
C. $20,000 - $30,000 a year 
D. $30,000 - $40,000 a year 
E. More than $40,000 a year 
F. Not applicable 
17. If you applied by yourself, circle all the answers that 
you used as part of your “income” when applying for the 
credit card: 
A. Income from a job 
B. Student loan proceeds 
C. Money from parents/family 
D. Other: _______________________________ 
E. Not applicable 
